302 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy : 



I J. As philosophy is a knowledge of causes, and as the mind is the 

 principal concurrent cause in every act of knowledge, philosophy is 

 hound to make the mind its first and paramount object of consider- 

 ation (I. pp. 61-2). 



Philosophy is, therefore, in its stricter meaning, confined to the 

 sciences which constitute, or hold immediately of, the science of mind 

 (I. p. 64). 



§ 2. — Division of Philosophy. 



As such, philosophy is threefold, for it is an answer to three 

 questions. 



I. What are the facts or phenomena to be observed ? The depart- 

 ment of philosophy, which answers this question, is commonly called 

 Psychology^ Empirical Psychology^ or the Inductive Philosophy of 

 Mind. We might call it Phenomenal Psychology. 



II. What are the laws which regulate these facts, or under which 

 these phenomena appear ? The department which answers this ques- 

 tion may be called the Nomology of Mind or Nomological Psychology. 



III. What are the real results, not immediately manifested, which 

 these facts or phenomena warrant us in drawing ? The philosophical 

 science which answers this, is usually called Ontology, or Metaphysics 

 proper. It might be named Inferential Psychology . 



Of these divisions of philosophy, the last two must evidently be 

 founded on the first. With the first, therefore, it is necessary to 

 begin (I. pp. 121-5). 



FIRST DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY.— PHENOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. 



Phenomenal Psychology is the science conversant about the phe- 

 nomena or modifications or states of the mind (I. p. 129). 



introduction to phenomenal psychology. — CONSCIOUSNESS. 



§ 1. General Nature of Consciousness. 



In order to discover the phenomena of the mind, it is necessary to 

 know the characteristic by which they are distinguished from all 

 others. This is consciousness, i.e., the knowledge that I, that the 

 Ego exists in some determinate state. In this knowledge alone they 

 are realized, and with this knowledge they disappear (I. pp. 182-3). 

 The phenomena of the mind are thus merely special forms of the 

 generic phenomenon, consciousness ; and accordingly consciousness 

 becomes naturally the first object of consideration (I. p. 189). 



Though we may be fully aware of what it is, consciousness cannot 



