AN EXPOSITION AND CRITICISM. 303 



be defined ; for it is itself the highest source of all comprehensibility 

 and illustration. The notion of consciousness cannot therefore be 

 resolved into any more simple, or brought under one more general. 

 But consciousness may be analysed, and it is thus found, in its sim- 

 plicity, to involve three things : — 1, A recognising or knowing subject ; 

 2, A recognised or known modification ; 3, A recognition or know- 

 ledge by the subject of the modification (I. pp. 192-3). We may 

 therefore lay it down as the most general characteristic of conscious- 

 ness, that it is the recognition by the thinking subject of its own acts 

 and affections (I. p. 201). 



§ 2. Special Conditions of Consciousness. 



So far, philosophers are agreed ; but it is more diflScult to determine 

 the special characteristics of consciousness. I shall therefore state : — 



I, Those which are too palpable to be called in question. These 

 are, that consciousness — 



1. Is an actual, not a potential, knowledge ; 



2. Is an immediate, not a mediate, knowledge ; 



3. Implies a discrimination (a) of self from not-self, (5) of the 

 different states of self, (c) of the different parts and qualities of not-self ; 



4. Implies judgment, inasmuch as (a) discrimination is merely the 

 denying one thing of another, and (b) the consciousness of any object 

 involves an affirmation of its external, or internal, existence ; 



5. Implies memory, inasmuch as, (a) "without it the mental states 

 could not be retained in order to their discrimination, and (5) the 

 notion of self arises from the recognised permanence and identity of 

 the subject in contrast to the recognised succession and variety of its 

 modifications (I. pp. 201-5). 



II. It is not, however, so generally admitted that consciousness is 

 not a special faculty coordinate with the other special faculties of 

 knowledge, but the generic faculty which is coextensive with them 

 all (I. p. 207).* On the contrary, it is maintained by Reid, Stewart, 

 Roger Collard, and others — 1, That consciousness is merely a special 



•* This is described by Hamilton as only " the first contested position " 

 -which he intends to maintain, with regard to consciousness (I. p. 206) ; but 

 it leads him into a long digression (I. pp. 206-263), at the close of which 

 there is no mention of any other contested positions. Did this digression 

 cause him to forget his . apparent intention to continue the subject from 

 which he started ? His editors give no indication that they have observed 

 this seeming omission. — J. C. M. 



Vol. XI. V 



