304 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON S PHILOSOPHY: 



faculty of knowledge ; and consequently, 2, that its special object is 

 the operations of the other faculties to the exclusion of the objects 

 about which these operations are conversant. But neither of these 

 positions is tenable, for — 



1. Though I may feel without knowing, though I may perceive 

 without imagining, and imagine without perceiving ; though I may 

 in general perform an operation of one of the special faculties without 

 requiring to perform an operation of any other, I can perform an 

 operation of none without being conscious of it. Consciousness can- 

 not therefore be distinguished from the special faculties in the same 

 way in which they are distinguished from one another ; it is the 

 necessary condition of them all. 



2. Knowledge is a relation between an operation and its object. 

 The object, in fact, determines the distinctive character of the act ; 

 and we could not be conscious of any one act as distinguished from 

 others, were we unconscious of the object by which it is determined 

 (I. pp. 207-231 ; Discussions, pp. 47-52). 



§ 3. Evidence and Authority of Consciousness. 



Consciousness is therefore the condition of all the mental pheno- 

 mena ; and accordingly it is mainly, if not solely, to consciousness, 

 that we must resort for an acquaintance with these phenomena (I. p. 

 264.) According to the doctrine of phrenology indeed, an acquain- 

 tance with the various mental powers may be obtained by observation 

 of the various parts of the brain, which that science maintains that it 

 has discovered to be their several organs. But though the mind, in 

 its lower energies and affections, is immediately dependent on the 

 conditions of the nervous system, and, in general, the development of 

 the brain in different species of animals is correspondent to their 

 intelli°ence, still it is impossible to connect the mind or its faculties 

 ■with particular parts of the nervous system (I. p. 404). For I have 

 proved, by the most extensive induction, that the alleged physiological 

 facts, on which phrenology professes to be based, such as its asser- 

 tion of the correspondence between the development of the cerebellum 

 and the function which it ascribes to it, are often not only unfounded, 

 but the very reverse of the truth (I. pp. 409 et seq.; Discussions, p. 647). 



It is therefore by the investigation of consciousness that we are to 

 discover the phenomena of the mind ; and accordingly if our informa- 

 tion regarding these phenomena is to be accepted as reliable, the de- 

 liverances of consciousness must be presumed to be trustworthy. Now 



