368 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 



logy ; but even of this department he has by no means treated' 

 exhaustively all the subdivisions which he indicates. The third' 

 class of mental phenomena, for example, he enumerates merely inci- 

 dentally in order to point out the diflferent kinds of feeling which they 

 originate ; and although he not only discusses at considerable length 

 the general theory of the feelings, but enters with some detail into the 

 illustration of that theory, yet it is evident that the six lectures,,. 

 which he devotes to the subject, cannot be regarded as much more 

 than a mere sketch. It is, therefore, the science of knowledge that 

 occupies by far the most extensive portion of Sir William Hamilton's 

 writings, though of this science itself his discussion on several sections 

 is found to be very unfinished even when we have with difficulty and 

 perplexity collated all the references scattered throughout his differ- 

 ent works. It is not, however, to be overlooked that, while confining 

 himself chiefly to the science of knowledge, he has yet, at least, indi- 

 cated the principles on which he attempts to solve the most important 

 problems in the science of being. 



As introductory to Phenomenal Psychology, Sir William Hamilton' 

 discusses, in its most essential aspects, the universal condition of psy- 

 chological phenomena, consciousness; and in his doctrine of con- 

 sciousness are already implied the principles on which he founds the 

 most important positions in his theories of knowledge and of existence. 

 It is to the consideration of this doctrine that the present article will- 

 be limited. 



At the outset it is necessary to notice the connection in which the sub- 

 ject of consciousness is introduced by Sir William Hamilton. In pro- 

 ceeding to classify the mental phenomena, he observes : — "These are alt 

 seen to comprise one essential element, or to be possible only under one 

 necessary condition. This element or condition is consciousness.'"*" 



Now, it is impossible in this connection not to notice the fact that, 

 in spite of the statement now quoted. Sir William holds, not only that 

 there are states of mind without this element or condition, but that 

 all states of mind, even after a consciousness of them has ceased, still 

 continue to exist. The contradiction between these two positions 

 must be admitted to be apparent, if it is not real ; and it has not only 

 been pointed out by Mr. Mill, in his Examination of Hainilton's 

 Philosophy, ■\ but it had been brought before the attention of Hamilton 



* Ltd. on Metaph., Vol. I., p. 182. 

 t See Chapter |XV. 



