SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON S PHILOSOPHY. 369 



himself by some of his own students longago. Mr. Mill, indeed, regards 

 this as one of numerous contradictions, which Hamilton had failed to 

 discoYcr between his different opinions ; and he founds his charge of 

 inconsistency in the present instance on the fact, that the doctrine of 

 latent mental states conflicts with several isolated expressions in 

 Hamilton's writings tantamount to that which I have quoted above. 

 I am not prepared to assert, that Sir "William was himself unaware 

 of the appearance of antagonism between the doctrines which are thus 

 placed in opposition, nor do I think such antagonism can be proved 

 , to be real from the impossibility of reconciling separate statements 

 made with different ends in view. It seems to me impossible to 

 relieve Hamilton from the charge of not having sufficiently guarded 

 these different statements, but in his expressions with regard to con- 

 sciousness, as the condition under which alone the mental phenom- 

 ena are realized, there is a certain caution which induces me to believe 

 that he was consciously endeavouring to avoid any interference 

 with his doctrine of latent mental states. 



It is but fair, in interpreting an author's doctrine on any subject, 

 not to press too stringently incidental allusions to it introduced in the 

 course of a discussion on something else, but we may justly hold him 

 bound by the expressions he employs, when his main object is to state 

 the doctrine in question. Now, in the passage which I have quoted 

 from the Lectures on Metaphysics, undoubtedly it was Hamilton's 

 design to point out a general characteristic by which the phenomena of 

 mind are distinguished ; yet he takes care to limit his statement to the 

 phenomena of mind as such, and seems purposely to avoid extending 

 it to all mental states. " In this knowledge they (the phenomena of 

 mind,) appear, or are realized as phenomena, and with this knowledge 

 they likewise disappear, or have no longer a phenomenal existence." 

 It is apparently with the same intention that he qualifies a statement 

 in the posthumous note on consciousness, appended to his edition of 

 Reid's Works. "Consciousness is to be regarded as a general expres- 

 sion, for the primary and fundamental condition of all the energies 

 and affections of our minds, inasmuch as these are known to exist."* 

 If this interpretation of these passages be correct, it must be supposed 

 that Hamilton held consciousness to be the condition of mental states only 

 in so far as these are phenomena or manifestations of mind, but that 

 this condition does not preclude the existence of states which, as they 



• See p. 929. 



