370 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy. 



do not manifest tliomselves, are beyond the sphere of consciousness. 



There is, however, an objection to this interpretation, and it is with 

 a view to this objection that I have drawn attention to the connection 

 in which Hamilton introduces the subject of consciousness into his 

 lectures. He introduces it as a subject that must be considered 

 before entering on an account of the several species of mental 

 phenomena ; and the reason which he assigns for this is, that all 

 these different species are contained under consciousness as their 

 ^enus. Now, the classification of mental phenomena, which he 

 describes in this connection, undoubtedly contemplates these as 

 states of mind in general, without any limitation whatever ; and it 

 seems at times as if, in making consciousness the " one essential 

 element," the "one necessary condition" of these phenomena, he 

 meant it to be regarded as the differentiating characteristic by which, 

 ]iot some modifications of the m.ind are distinguished from others, but 

 all are distinguished from the modifications of matter. I ground 

 this remark, not so much upon the two isolated statements adduced 

 by Mr. Mill, as upon passages where it must be supposed that 

 Sir William was on his guard in his mode of expressing this doctrine. 

 The sentence, which I quoted above from the posthumous note on 

 consciousness, is immediately followed by another which is connected 

 with it as its reason by the word for, and which runs thus : " While 

 knowledge, feeling and desire, in all their various modifications, can 

 only exist as the knowledge, feeling and desire of some determined 

 subject, and as this subject can only know, feel and desire inasmuch 

 as he is conscious that he knows, feels and desires, it is therefore 

 manifest that all the actions and passions of the intellectual self 

 involve consciousness as their generic and essential quality." Simi- 

 larly in combating Reid's doctrine, that consciousness is a special 

 faculty of knowledge distinguished from the other special faculties as 

 they are from each other, he observes : " Consciousness, consequently, 

 is not one of the special modes into which our mental activity may 



be resolved, but the fundamental form,- the generic condition of 



them all." * Notwithstanding these statements he maintains " that 

 the sphere of our conscious modifications is only a small circle in the 

 centre of a far wider sphere of action and passion, of which we are 

 only conscious through its effects." f '^his position may admit of 



* Biscuisions, p. 48. 



t Lid. on Metaph., Vol. I. p. 349. 



