376 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy. 



to mind as well as to matter ; but like all forms of the general law 

 under which it comes, as it arises from the limitation or impotence 

 of the mind, it expresses merely a necessity of thought, not a neces- 

 sity of things. It is evident that, on this theory, the compulsory 

 reference, by our consciousness, of its changing phenomena to a mind 

 as their permanent subject, is wholly inadmissible testimony to the 

 real existence of such a subject. Now, there is undoubtedly a differ- 

 ence in the modes in which Hamilton and Kant severally explain, or 

 rather explain away, this testimony of consciousness ; but on what 

 ground the former can justly complain of the latter for disputing the 

 testimony as if he himself allowed it, one cannot very easily discover. 

 It seems at times indeed as if the necessities of thought had been too strong 

 in Hamilton's mind to yield before the attacks of his own philosophy - 

 of the Conditioned ; and it is certainly difficult to read the passage, 

 in which he discusses the existence, individuaUty and identity of the 

 mind, without the conviction that, when he wrote it, he himself 

 believed these facts to be revealed in trustworthy deliverances of our 

 consciousness. He is not unwilling to speak of the belief in the 

 existence or substantiality of the mind as an intuition : and, although 

 he afterwards derives it from the Law of the Conditioned, he declares 

 in the passage under consideration, that "it is a simple and ultimate 

 fact of consciousness," which, as such, " cannot be deduced or demon- 

 strated. "f 



Returning to the analysis of consciousness we can now more clearly 

 understand what it implies. In spite of the language just quoted 

 the general drift of Hamilton's most essential doctrines compels us to 

 conclude that, in describing consciousness as a relation between a 

 mind and its modifications, in which the former recognises the latter, 

 he did not mean it to be understood that the mind recognises itself 

 at the same time. 



In reviewing this analysis of consciousness it is impossible to over- 

 look the fact of its inconsistency with principles not only allowed, 

 but even inculcated strenuously by Hamilton himself. I have already, 

 in this connection, directed attention to his use of the logical law, 

 that the knowledge of correlative terms is one ; but it is instructive 

 to notice more exactly the recoil upon his own doctrine regarding 

 consciousness of the argument in which he urges this law against the 

 doctrine on the same subject attributed to Reid. The doctrine of 



f Led. on-Melaph., Vol I., pp. 3T1-2, 



