SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy. 381 



selves."* A much bolder assertion is justified by the facts of t^ 

 case ; for not only is it impossible to regard the phrenological method 

 as the exclusively reliable vpay of obtaining information concerning 

 the phenomena of mind, but it is evident that such a method by 

 itself can discover nothing vrhatever of these phenomena. To make 

 this evident it is not necessary to enter into the physiological ques- 

 tions discussed by Sir WilHam Hamilton ; it is necessary merely to 

 consider what kind of knowledge alone can be furnished by an obser- 

 vation of cerebral structure and functions. 



In this consideration I shall say nothing of the great imperfections 

 which, in spite of the advances made even since the time of Hamilton,, 

 still continue attached to the physiology of the nervous system. 

 Suppose this department of physiology and the corresponding depart- 

 ment of anatomy were as perfect as they ever can be, what could they 

 accomplish? They may furnish a minute acquaintance with the 

 physical structure and with the chemical constituents of the brain and 

 the nerves ; they may succeed in generalising the physical or chemical 

 laws of which nervous action presents a special form ; they may thus 

 bring the nerve-force into correlation and convertibility with the 

 other forces of the material universe : but in all this what approach 

 has been made to the discovery of one of those phenomena which are 

 distinguished as mental ? Absolutely, it must be answered, no 

 approach whatever. For the phenomena of my mind — my thoughts, 

 my feelings, my wishes — are all actions which I perform and am con- 

 scious of performing, or states in which I exist and am conscious of 

 existing; whereas the phenomena revealed to me by observation of 

 the brain are all actions performed by something that is not I, states 

 in which something that is not I exists. Now, it is, indeed, impos- 

 sible to prove the assertion, but to every one who reflects the assertion 

 is self-evident, that I, as well as the actions which I perform and the 

 states in which I exist, my thoughts, and feelings and wishes can be 

 discovered only by me, that is, by a consciousness of myself, certainly 

 cannot be discovered in anything that is not I. The evidence of this^ 

 assertion may be made more pointed by the reflection, that all that 

 can be discovered in the observation of the nervous system and its 

 modes of action must be one or other of those phenomena which are 

 capable of affecting the external senses ; and, indeed, it is mainly to 



* Logic, VI, 4, 1. The statement is homologated by Mr. Lewes in his Comte's- 

 Philosophy of the Scie7ices, p. 210. 



