384 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 



Starting point of philosophy. The phenomena, which philosophy 

 investigates, are, we have seen, discoverable only by consciousness : it 

 is consequently on the facts revealed in consciousness that philosophy 

 must be based ; and in order that this basis should be secure con- 

 sciousness must be a revealer of facts, not of illusions. In all this 

 Sir William Hamilton will undoubtedly be followed with assent by 

 those who have sought the ultimate foundation of our beliefs ; but it 

 is necessary to observe a distinction, which he draws, between two dif- 

 ferent aspects in which the testimony of consciousness may be view- 

 ed. In the first place consciousness may be regarded as bearing wit- 

 ness to its own existence ; but it may also in a second aspect be con- 

 sidered as testifying with regard to facts beyond itself. Now, he 

 maintains, it is impossible to question the testimony of consciousness 

 in the former aspect ; I cannot doubt that I am conscious wihout 

 doubting and thus annihilating my doubt, since it must be a state of 

 consciousness : but in the latter aspect the testimony of consciousness 

 may, without contradiction, be doubted, though such a doubt, by surren- 

 dering the veracity of consciousness, would remove the foundation of 

 philosophy. It appears to me, however, that Sir William Hamilton 

 has not contemplated all the points of view from which the testimony 

 of consciousness may be regarded. It is possible, I think, to ask 

 three questions with regard to that testimony : (1) Is there such a 

 fact as consciousness, ami really conscious at all? (2) Admitting 

 that I am conscious, what is it I am conscious of? in other words ad- 

 mitting the existence of consciousness, what is the fact to ^^hich it 

 testifies ? (3) Suppose I know the fact to which consciousness testi- 

 fies, is its testimony trustworthy ? Now I am unable to explain 

 Hamilton's applicationi of the twofold distinction which he draws 

 except on the supposition that he has failed to discriminate the first 

 two of the three questions which I have now stated. His remarks on 

 the former of the two aspects in which he contemplates the testimony 

 of consciousness are true only in reference to the first of the three 

 questions which I have distinguished ; but he frequently urges his 

 remarks, especially against an antagonist, as if they were true in 

 reference to the second of these questions. For instance, to illus- 

 trate his distinction he takes the phenomenon of external perception, 

 in which, he maintains, the fact declared by consciousness is that I 

 have an immediate knowledge of a non-ego. "Of this,"Jhe argues, "as 

 a phenomenon, doubt is impossible. For, as has been seen, we cannot 



