386 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy. 



terpreted by him, in an act of perception, is beyond all scepticism ; for 

 we shall find when we advance to the consideration of this subject, 

 that such scepticism is expressed by authorities who are perfectly 

 competent to give their version of the fact attested by consciousness. 

 Were it necessary to illustrate further the uncertainty that arises in 

 ascertaining the testimony of consciousness, another appropriate 

 example presents itself in connection with Hamilton's doctrine of the 

 causal judgment. In that judgment, as observed by him, the fact 

 attested by consciousness is merely the impotence of the mind to con- 

 ceive that a phenomenon, now appearing, was formerly non-existent, 

 and the consequent necessitation of the mind to conceive the phenom- 

 enon as having previously existed in other forms . I should say, that 

 probably not one of a hundred observers, on turning their attention to 

 this subject, would accept such a statement as expressing the fact of 

 which they are conscious when they judge that a certain phenomenon 

 must have had a cause. Yet " there is in truth nothing," says Hamil- 

 ton, " which men seem to admit so lightly as an asserted fact."* 

 How many of his disciples have admitted his interpretation of the fact 

 implied in the causal judgment merely because it is asserted by him ? 

 Both Mr. Millf and Professor Bain;t^ have insisted on the difficulty, 

 which I have now illustrated, of discovering the exact facts attested 

 by consciousness ; and their remarks are well worthy of study. They 

 do not however point out the source of Hamilton's mistake, which, 

 as I have indicated, is to be found in his confusion of two very differ- 

 ent questions under one question of ambiguous import. His error 

 is thus to be explained as a Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum. To 

 use his own illustration, he might be regarded as saying to the de- 

 fender of representative perception, "Do you admit the fact of con- 

 sciousness in an act of external perception ? " *' Certainly," will be 

 the answer, "the fact of consciousness cannot be doubted." "Then 

 you must admit the reality of the fact, or you deny the truthfulness 

 of consciousness and destroy the possibility of philosophy." " Hold !" 

 the representationist may justly reply, " I admitted the fact of con- 

 sciousness, meaning the fact that I am conscious ; for that cannot be 

 doubted : but I do not admit the fact of consciousness, if you mean 

 the fact of which you say that I am conscious ; that is by no means 

 beyond scepticism." 



* Zecf. on Metaph., Vol. I., p. 169. 

 t Exam, of Hamilton, p. 502, 1st ed. 

 i Emotions and Will, pp. 513-9, 2nd ed. 



