FRENCH IRON-CLAD SQUADRON. 193 



the advances which are being made around him by the different branches of 

 human science and industry. It may happen that, when some great discovery 

 has been made in one direction, it would not be prudent for an artist to apply it 

 in practice, because he may not know the means of making it harmonise with 

 the other data of his art. In order to advance with any success in his own path, 

 he must not only always base his calculations on acquired certainties, but, and it 

 is here the most delicate point lies, he must never attempt anything beyond the 

 limits of the mutual accordances which these certainties present. Thus the wish 

 to get the double advantage of two gun-decks, and more gims than a frigate (pro- 

 perly speaking) carries, has necessitated the leaving large spaces unprotected by 

 armour, both in the bow and stern and in the main and lower decks. It is to be 

 feared that this is not very consonant to sound military principles, for, despite the 

 excellence of the arrangements which have been made to combat this danger, the 

 chance of fire is always there, and this is at once the most formidable and the 

 most dreaded enemy of the sailor. No cannonade, be it as deadly as it may, 

 produces in the sailor's mind anything like the eff(?et of the simple cry of "fire !" 

 And fire on board of an iron-clad would produce all the more effect on their minds 

 because a belief in its incombustibleness is almost necessarily attached to the 

 idea of the armour, and the sailors would fancy that they had been deceived. 

 I know quite well what the remedy will be. Our builders, if they are not at pre- 

 sent ready to build ships completely armour-plated, will soon be so, and the force 

 of circumstances is pushing them on to it in spite of the resistance which financial 

 considerations oppose to the project. In war the only economy is to ensure vic- 

 tory ; and whatever be the price that ships completely clad in armor may amount 

 to, it will have to be borne when our builders know how to make them. The 

 same thing will happen as already has happened with the old sailing vessels and ; 

 wooden steamers, which, starting in 1830 with the Sphinx, of 120 horse-power? 

 and four guns, became, in 1846, the Napoleon, of 900 horses and 90 guns, and, in 

 1850, the Bretagjie, of 1200 horses and 180 guna. In the same way, at the com- 

 mencement of this century, there was in 3 11 the European navies a large number 

 of 50-gun ships of the line, two-deckers, lilie the Solferino ; and since 1827 we 

 have been putting on the stocks two-deckers mounting 100 guns. And again, in 

 the same way, we have seen the merchant steamers starting from 600 tons and 

 160 horse power, which was their highest up to the year 1830, and now reaching 

 4000 tons and 1000 horses in the vessels of the great transatlantic lines. But I 

 repeat that all this has only been done, and can only be done, progressively, by 

 the advantage of time and investigations patiently pursued from step to step, . 

 Meanwhile, if there be a necessity of copying the model of the Solferino, would . 

 it not be possible to substitute iron for wood in the improtected part of the 

 side above the water-line ? Unless there be some strocger reasons foi' avoiding . 

 this combination, it wonld have the very great advantage of considerably less- 

 ening the chances of fire. Be this as it may, and even if it cannot be consi- 

 dered very military to leave a part of the ship's side exposed without the defence 

 of the armor to the incendiary missiles of the enemy, it is in fact quite certain 

 that the Magenta and the Solferino have Ipst absolutely nothing, in a naval point 

 of view, from carrying their two decks of guns. Much to the contrary, the sailing , 



