REVIEWS. 415 



isted, the possibility of the nothing (or absence of existence) ceases, 

 and there remains the necessary existence of something. 



PitOP. III. — A being which has in another distinct being the cause of 

 its existence, might have not existed. (^Ha podido no existir.') 

 Because if its existence were necessary, it would exist as a neces- 

 sary consequence of the otber being, and would then be a necessary 

 part of it, and not a distinct being, which is contrary to supposition. 



Pbop. IV. — Some being has existed which has had in itself the cause 

 of its existence. 



In effect, if no being had. had in itself the cause of its existence, 

 every being would have had in another distinct being the cause of 

 its existence ; but since a being which has had in another distinct 

 being the cause of its existence might have not existed (Pt-ojo. 3.), 

 it follows that the existence of something would not be necessary, 

 which is contrary to Prop. 2 ; therefore it is false that no being has 

 had in itself the cause of its existence ; and therefore some being haa 

 existed which has had in itself the cause of its existence. 



Pbop. V. — A being which has had in itself the cause of its existence 

 (1). . . . Cannot have had a beginning : — 

 I^or if at any time it did not exist, then in passing from non-exist- 

 ence to existence, it must have had in another being the cause of its 

 existence, which is contrary to supposition. 

 (2). . . . Is a necessary being : — 

 Because if it were not so, then since the remaining beings, which 

 have had in another distinct being the cause of their existence, might 

 have not existed (Prop. 3), it would follow that it was not necessary 

 that at some time some being should have existed, which is contrary 

 ta Prop. 2. 



(3). . . . Cannot have an end : — 

 Because its existence having been necessary, there is no reason 

 why the prolongation of its existence should cease to be necessary. 

 (4). . . . Is infinitely wise : — 

 Because, from having in itself absolutely the cause of its existence, 

 it is plain that it has an exact knowledge of its own essence ; this 

 knowledge requires an exact knowledge of all the remaining essences 

 because they all have some relation among each other, and one of 

 them cannot be exactly known without knowing in the same manner 

 all the rest. 



