416 ftEVlEWSi 



(5). . . . Is inflniiety powerful : — 



Because being infinitely wise, it knows all tlie means of effecting 

 all that is possible, {d$ reali&ar los posiblts.') 



CoKCLDSTON. — A being, necessary, eternal in both senses, omnipotent 

 and omniscient, and vDhich v)e call tht Deity, therefofe exists. 



Witli the quasi-matberaatical form of this reasoning) readers of 

 inetaphvsics are familiar, from the days of Descartes and Spinoza 

 down to the late lamented Ferrier, but the substance of the above is 

 remarkable as being almost a reproduction of the argumentation of 

 Br. Samuel Clarke, in his "Demonstration of the Being and Attri* 

 butes of God>" a work which is unsurpassed for acuteness, depth, 

 and we may add, difficulty* That our readers may judge of the par- 

 ullelism, we append part of the chain of propositions which Clarke 

 Bets out to establish. Prop. 1. Something has existed from eternity. 

 Prop. 2. There has eitisted from eternity some one immutable ayid indc" 

 pendent Being. Prop. 3. That immutable and independent Being, 

 whith has existed from eternity, uoithout any external cause of its ex' 

 istence, must b'e self-existent, that is^ necessarily -e::tisting<. These lat* 

 ter two propositions are identical with Props. 2-4 of our author. In 

 Clarke's Prop^ 2. " some one " must be interpreted as " some one 

 at least.*' Prop. 6. The self-6X.istent being must of necessity be inf" 

 nite und omnipresent. Against the demonstration of the latter part 

 of this propositions an ingenious objection was urged by Butler, who 

 afterwards was the famous author of the A.nalogy, and it is said by 

 Prof. Boole that " it does not appear that Dr. Clarke was ever able to 

 dispose effectually of this objection.*' This however is a mistake, as 

 Butler acknowledges himself satisfied on this head in his Letter IV. 

 It was to an objection made by Butler against the subsequent propo- 

 sition that Dr. Clarke does not appear to have made a satisfactory 

 teply. Prop. 7. The selfeotistent being must of necessity be but one. 

 Prop. 8. That the self-existent and original cause of all things must 

 he an intelligent being. Prop. 9. Is not a necessary agent, bnt a 

 being endowed u)ith liberty and choice. Prop. 10. Must of necessity 

 have infinite power. Prop. 11. Must be infinitely u)ise. Prop. 12. 

 Must have all moral perfections, snth as become the Supreme Governor 

 nnd Judge of tM Worlds 



It will thus be seen that Senor Li^vano can hardly be credited 

 with originality in his demonstration, but the manner in which be 

 has condensed Clarke*s reasoning is very remarkable^ With regard 



