Vol. XII, No. i. 



WASHINGTON 



January, iqoi 



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THE INFLUENCE OF SUBMARINE CABLES 

 UPON MILITARY AND NAVAL SUPREMACY 



By George O. Squier, Capt. Signal Corps, U. S. A. 



THE accidental non-delivery of two 

 cable messages from the Minister 

 of Marine (Bermejo) to the Com- 

 mander-in-Chief of the Spanish Squad- 

 ron (Cervera) at Martinique, undoubt- 

 edly largely changed the whole history of 

 the Spanish-American War. 



One of these telegrams informed him 

 of coal supply near at hand, and the other 

 granted him permission to return at once, 

 with his squadron, to Spain. 



Admiral Cervera's firm stand against 

 the despatch of the Spanish squadron 

 from the coast of Spain to West Indian 

 waters is heroically and almost patheti- 

 cally shown in the recent publication, by 

 permission of the Queen Regent, of the 

 official despatches. At Cape Verde, and 

 before and after, by cable and by letter, 

 he points out the unpreparedness of his 

 squadron, and predicts its certain de- 

 struction if it proceeds. Knowing his 

 strong views, it is probable that he would 

 have lost no time in coaling and starting 

 back to Spain. 



With Cervera's squadron returned to 

 Spain there would have been no Santiago 

 campaign, the Flying Squadron would 



probably have been sent to the coast of 

 Spain, and the land operations in Cuba 

 directed against Havana. 



Cervera's fleet not eliminated, who can 

 say how long Spain may not have been 

 able to resist, and what additional blood 

 and treasure the struggle may have cost 

 the United States. 



The story of the Spanish-American 

 War is largely a story of " coal and 

 cables." That war for the first time 

 demonstrated the dominating influence 

 of submarine cable communications in 

 the conduct of a naval war. As a result 

 of it the principal maritime powers, with 

 colonial possessions, are each at present 

 elaborating their " cable policy," and 

 have awakened to a realization of the 

 fact that reliable submarine communica- 

 tions under exclusive control are not only 

 absolutely necessary, but exercise a dom- 

 inating influence upon the control of the 

 seas, whether in commercial strategy or 

 in military and naval strategy. 



A modern war between two naval pow- 

 ers has reduced itself largely to a war 

 of " coal and cables," 



At present the submarine telegraph is 



