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SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY : 

 AN EXPOSITION AND CRITICISM. 



BY THE REV. J. CLARK MURRAY, 



PROFESSOR OF MENTAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY, QUEEN S COLLEGE, KINGSTON. 



Article IV. — Criticism of Hamilton's System, Continued. 



The last article of this series was occupied with the criticism of 

 Hamilton's doctrine of consciousness, which may be regarded in the 

 light of an introduction to his whole system of philosophy. The next 

 subject, which I propose to discuss, is the doctrine of External 

 Perception, inasmuch as it seems to me to involve a greater number 

 of the most important principles of his philosophy than any other 

 doctrine. 



Referring for the details of his theory of perception to the exposition 

 of his system in the second article of this series, I think it necessary 

 here merely to recall the general position, which he endeavours to 

 defend and explain, that man has an intuition or immediate knowledge 

 of a nonego or matter as existing in space. That we possess such an 

 immediate knowledge, he maintains, is the natural or unbiassed testi- 

 mony of human consciousness; and accordingly he names his own 

 system Natural Realism. On the other hand, those who deny such 

 an immediate knowledge of matter, but still maintain that matter really 

 exists, are obliged to explain by various hypotheses our belief in its 

 reality ; and the^e philosophers he accordingly proposes to name Ei/po- 

 thetical Realists. The system of Hypothetical Realism is that which 

 has found most general favour among philosophers, and it is that 

 which Hamilton has set himself specially to overthrow. The present 

 article will be devoted mainly to the criticism of his polemic against 

 this system. 



(A.) The first point, which demands attention in connection with 

 this subject, is Hamilton's appeal to the natural testimony of human 

 consciousness as being in favour of his position, that man has an intui- 

 tive knowledge of an extended nonego. That such is the natural 

 testimony of our consciousness, he does not assert merely on his own 

 authority, but he maintains to be proved by the admissions even of 

 those philosophers who refuse to acknowledge the trustworthiness of 

 the testimony. 



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