58 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy. 



I. At the outset of this discussion, therefore, it is necessary to 

 consider Hamilton's citation of his opponents as admitting the fact of 

 consciousness to which he appeals. A number of the most explicit 

 statements conveying this admission are quoted in his Dissertation on 

 the Philosophy of Common Sense, pp. 747-8,* and among these are 

 to be found passages from the writings of Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, 

 Schelling, Malebranche, Fichte, as well as of other philosophers. In a 

 passage in one of his lectures (Vol. I., pp. 289-92), where the same 

 subject is discussed, Hamilton selects from these statements those of 

 Berkeley and Hume ,* and we must therefore suppose that, at least 

 when he wrote his lectures, these two quotations seemed to him the 

 most suitable for his purpose. Yet it is impossible to avoid serious 

 misgivings as to the propriety of citing either of those two philoso- 

 phers as admitting the fact of the natural belief of mankind in the 

 reality of the things which they perceive through the senses, while 

 denying the authority of that belief. The quotation from Hume, 

 indeed, is, perhaps, less exceptionable than the other, but does not 

 admit, when correctly interpreted, of being applied to the purpose for 

 which it is adduced by Hamilton ; but certainly there is no mode in 

 which it is possible to justify his quotation from Berkeley.. The 

 passage quoted runs as follows : " I do not pretend to be a setter up 

 of new notions. My endeavours tend only to unite and place in a 

 clearer light that truth, which was before shared between the vulgar 

 and the philosophers : the former being of opinion, that those things 

 they immediately pe7'ceive are the real things : and the latter, that the 

 things immediately perceived are ideas lohich exist only in the mind. 

 "Which two notions put together, do, in effect, constitute the sub- 

 stance of what I advance." Now, even though Hamilton may not 

 have comprehended the main drift of Berkeley's philosophy, the above 

 passage might have taught him that there is no sense in which his 

 opponent could fairly be represented as rejecting the natural testimony 

 of consciousness to our immediate perception of a material reality. 

 On the contrary, that is a testimony to which, as Sir William Hamil- 

 ton himself admits, f Berkeley may rightfully appeal, and actually 

 " did appeal more confidently, perhaps more logically, than Keid." 

 Indeed, whatever judgment may be given as to the truth of Berkeley's 

 system, an impartial criticism cannot refrain from deciding that 



* See also Discussiom, p. 92, note. f Keid's "Works, p. 81 Y, note. 



