SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy. 59 



presents stronger claims to the name of Natural Eealisiii than can be 

 urged in favour of Hamilton's. For (1) while the former attributes 

 reality, in the sense in which he understands the term, to all sensible 

 objects, the secondary as well as the primary qualities of matter 

 indifferently, the latter limits our perception of reality to the primary 

 qualities, though there cannot be a doubt that the natural instinct of 

 mankind, unchecked by scientific reflection, is to believe, when a rose 

 is before the eyes, that its color is not less real than its figure. 

 Moreover (2) while the gist of Berkeley's arguments is to prove that 

 there is no unperceived reality underlying the objects of perception, 

 Hamilton, in a measure, destroys the realistic aspect of his system by 

 restoring, in his doctrine of the Conditioned, the unknown material sub- 

 stance which his opponent relegates to the category of unfounded hypo- 

 theses, contradicted by the natural convictions of mankind. It must 

 thus (3) be evident further, and it will appear more fully in the sequel, 

 that we are left in irremediable perplexity as to what Hamilton meant 

 by reality in consequence of his recognising realities underlying those 

 which are the immediate objects of perception, whereas the reality 

 which Berkeley attributes to these objects, and which, he believes, is 

 also attributed to them by the vulgar, has always a specific significa- 

 tion. But whatever may be thought of these remarks on the compara- 

 tive claims of the Hamiltonian and Berkeleyan philosophies to be 

 regarded as systems of Realism, it does not admit of doubt that 

 Berkeley can, in no fair view of his system, be represented as re- 

 jecting the admitted belief of the human mind as the reality of the 

 things perceived through the senses. The utmost that can be said is, 

 that his understanding of what is meant by reality difi'ers from Hamil- 

 ton's ; but a different interpretation is very far from a total denial of 

 the reality attributed to material things. 



The evidence wrung from Berkeley in favour of his Scottish opponent's 

 assertion is thus found to break down under examination ; and when we 

 look into Hume's evidence, we find that it can scarcely stand such a 

 test any better. The passage quoted, it must be remembered, occurs 

 in the Essay on the Sceptical or Academical Philosophy; and the 

 statements cited are written from the Sceptical point of view, asserting 

 nothing dogmatically either for or against our natural beliefs, but 

 merely poising agaiust each other antagonistic conclusions of the 

 human mind, so as to exhibit the instability of all purely speculative 

 results. In the passage adduced by Hamilton the equipoise instituted 



