SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. 61 



the sensuous perceptions of the mind ? Similarly the quotation from 

 Stiedenroth's Psychologie is capable of interpretation on either of the 

 above suppositions, though one would require to be acquainted with 

 the general doctrine of its author to explain with certainty the particular 

 drift of this passage. It is unnecessary to dwell upon those passages 

 to which Sir William Hamilton has referred without quoting them ; but 

 one may well ask, though one can scarcely hope to answer, what inter- 

 pretation, inconsistent with the doctrine of the Conditioned, it is possi- 

 ble to put on the following quotation from Tennemann : " The illusion 

 that things in themselves are cognisable is so natural, that we need not 

 marvel if even philosophers have not been able to emancipate themselves 

 from the prejudice. The common sense of mankind, which remains 

 steadfast within the sphere of experience, recognises no distinction 

 between things in themselves and phenomena; and the philosophising 

 reason commences therewith its attempt to investigate the foundations 

 of this knowledge and to recall itself into system." * 



The witnesses, summoned with so much confidence by Sir William 

 Hamilton, might therefore all be allowed to retire, on the ground that 

 their testimony does not bear upon the point which it is adduced to 

 prove, were it not that Sir William's most distinguished antagonist 

 allows the evidence of- a certain class of these witnesses. " Those 

 indeed," says Mr. Mill, " who, like Kant, believe that there are ele- 

 ments present, even at the first moment of internal consciousness, which 

 do not exist in the object, but are derived from the mind's own laws, 



are fairly open to Sir W. Hamilton's criticism But, as 



regards all existing schools of thought not descended from Kant, Sir 

 W. Hamilton's accusation is without ground." f One cannot but feel 

 at a loss in dealing with an assertion of this kind, not illustrated by any 

 explanation, or supported by any defence; but the authority of the 

 philosopher who makes the assertion claims for it some recognition in.' 

 this connection. Are we then, in deference to this authority, to admit 

 that Hamilton is justified in compelling Kant and his followers at least 

 to give evidence in his favour ? I am obliged to acknowledge that I 

 have altogether misinterpreted the drift of Kant's philosophy, if Mr. 

 Mill's charge against it is well founded. Undoubtedly Kant holds that, 

 even in our earliest perceptions, the relations of space and time, under 



* Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, pp. 160-J. 

 f Quoted in Discussions, p. 92, note. 



