61 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy. 



the intuition of an external objects makes its appearance. Could the 

 Scottish philosopher desire, or could we find in his works, a clearer or 

 more forcible expression of this intuition than is given in a passage 

 from one of Schelling's earlier writings, — a passage, which, if I have 

 traced his reference correctly, is among those referred to, without being 

 quoted, by Hamilton ? "I believe, no one will lightly deny that all 

 trustworthiness of our knowledge rests on the i/nmediateness of intui- 

 tion. The philosophers of the highest genius speak of the knowledge 

 of outward things as of a revelation which happens to us, not as if by 

 that means they meant to explain anything, but to indicate, that it is in 

 general impossible to bring about the connection between an object and 

 its apprehension (Torstellung) by means of intelligible conceptions. 

 They name our conviction with regard to outward things a hellcf, either 

 because the soul communicates most immediately with that which it 

 believes, or, to express it in a word, because that conviction is a truly 

 blind assurance, which does not rest on inferences (from cause to effect) 

 or on proofs of any kind. Moreover one cannot see, how any opinion, 

 which is produced only by means of arguments, can pass into the soul, 

 can become the ruling principle of action and of life in such a manner 

 as the belief in an external world. Whence comes this element of 

 immediateness, and of insuperable certainty arising from immediateness, 

 in our knowledge ? " * 



This mental phenomenon then being one, whose existence is admitted 

 by Sir W. Hamilton's opponents as distinctly as by himself, it is evident 

 that they did not consider such admission to be out of harmony with 

 their theories of perception ; and the impartial critic will, I am per- 

 suaded, agree with their opinion. It is necessary therefore to point out 

 the misapprehension which led Sir W. Hamilton to suppose that such 

 an admission is irreconcilable with any theory but his own. One source 

 of this erroneous impression has already been explained in treating of 

 his doctrine regarding the authority of consciousness as the ultimate 

 standard of appeal. It was then shown that he has failed to discriminate 

 the general fact, that in an act of perception I am conscious, and the 

 special fact, that in an act of perception I am conscions of an individual 

 object. The former of these it would be the climax not of scepticism, 

 but of madness, to question. It is easy enough moieover to state in 



* See Schelling's Abhandluncc^i zi.r I^rlauieruna des JdmUsinus da- JVlMiriS- 

 chc^tslehrt, lU. 



