C)6 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's niiLosoniY. 



there is a general iact, a general distinction, of which this is only a 

 special case. This general fact is the distinction of the Ego and the 

 non-Ego, and it belongs to consciousness as the general faculty. When- 

 ever, therefore, in our analysis of intellectual phenomena, we arrive at 

 an element which we cannot reduce to a generalisation from experience, 

 but which lies at the root of all experience, and which we cannot there- 

 fore resolve into any higher principle, — this we properly call a fact of 

 consciousness." "We have here, then, a distinct statement of a rule by 

 which wo arc restricted in appealing to the testimony of consciousness. 

 The veracity of this testimony must not be supposed to be involved in 

 the truth of the mental judgment contained in ani/ phenomenon of 

 consciousness. It is only when, after analysis, we have reached those 

 f:\cts which do not themselves admit of decomposition, that we are in a 

 position to declare the veracity of our natural beliefs at stake, and on 

 that ground to cite their authority. "We may indeed make a narrower 

 restriction, which would undoubtedly be admitted by Hamilton, that we 

 are at liberty to cite the authority of consciousness only when, by means 

 of the process which is more correctly called criticism than analysis, we 

 have discovered those facts which have not merely resisted all attempts 

 at decomposition hitherto, but must, from their characteristic attributes, 

 be declared incapable of being decomposed. Now, it may safely be said 

 that no one, who is inspired by an earnest love of science, will hesitate 

 to support Sir 'SV. Hamilton in maintaining the unimpeachable veracity 

 of such ultimate facts of consciousness, and the legitimacy of citing 

 their evidence as an authority from which there is no appeal ; but in 

 order to render the citation of this authority valid in any particalar 

 controvers}', it must, on Sir William's own showing, be first of all made 

 out, that the fact adduced is truly ultimate and simple. In the present 

 case, therefore, it is not enough to have determined with scientific pre- 

 cision the object of which we are conscious when consciousness has been 

 developed into an act of external perception ; it is absolutely requi- 

 site to show that the diflerentiation of ego and nouego and the recog- 

 nition of the nouego as occupying space have not been, and cannot have 

 been, an evolution from simpler facts. 



Now, it will be found that Sir William Hamilton does adduce 

 reasons, whicli must be acknowledged to be, if not perfectly conclu- 

 sive, at least very forcible, to prove the ultimate character of the 

 essential fl\cts which are implied in external perception ; and these 

 reasons will afterwards demand our consideration. At present our 



