SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy. 71 



ing a resistance to the voluntary activity of the perceiver. Besides 

 these four facts I know of no other constituent element of perception. 



In strictness, therefore, there are only two facts essential, and at the 

 same time peculiar to the mental phenomenon of sense=perception ; 

 these are the facts, that the objects of perception are perceived as exist, 

 in space, and as resisting our voluntary exertion. The perception of 

 space and the perception of resistance present, consequently, a primary 

 claim to consideration. But the more general aspect of perception, in 

 which its objects are presented as different from the perceiver, is usually 

 discussed along with the others, and it is so by Hamilton, who com- 

 monly describes perception, in its most essential form, simply as an 

 immediate knowledge of the nonego or not-self. It will, therefore, 

 probably be found advantageous, at least in the present criticism, to 

 follow the order thus pointed out, and commence our discussion with 

 .this aspect of the phenomenon under investigation. 



I. It is unfortunately necessary, at the outset of this discussion, to 

 insist most explicitly on a strict adherence to the precise meaning of 

 the term nonego or notself. Clearly these words express nothing but 

 the object of knowledge considered as different from the knower. If 

 the object of knowledge admits of more specific determination, this is 

 not implied in the designation of it as nonego. The special inquiry, 

 therefore, to which we are limited at present, seeks to discover merely 

 how the ego becomes conscious of the nonego, how /become conscious 

 of that which is not I. Now, evidently, the consciousness of that 

 which is not myself becomes possible only in controst with the con- 

 sciousness of myself, as the consciousness of self can emerge only in 

 the simultaneous consciousness of notself. The inquiry, therefore, into 

 the origin of our consciousness of the nonego reduces itself to the ques- 

 tion, what originates in every human consciousness the antithesis of 

 me and that which is not I ? 



Evident though these statements seem to be, the looseness with 

 which the correlative terms ego and nonego are used, shows that it is 

 far from being unnecessary to direct attention to the facts stated. The 

 most celebrated philosophical work, published within recent years, is 

 undoubtedly the Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy by 

 Mr. Mill; yet, in a chapter of that work entitled "The Psychological 

 Theory of the belief in matter, how far applicable to mind," there occur 

 the following observations :* " Although these two elements, an ego 



* See p. 204, 1st edition. 



