A.' 



SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY. i'o 



that it is not identical with the self, however intimately associated with 

 it it may be. 



What interpretation then is mental science to adopt of self-conscious- 

 ness ? Is it to be regarded as a fact which is required for the explana- 

 tion of all the other phenomena of consciousness, but which is itself 

 incapable of being explained ? Or can it be explained as a development 

 from the recognized laws of a consciousness in which the distinction of 

 self and notself has not yet made its appearance ? We have to consider 

 what Sir W. Hamilton has done towards the solution of this problem. 

 By referring to my previous article in the last number of this journal,* 

 it will be found that his doctrine on this subject has been discussed at 

 considerable length in connection with his analysis of consciousness. 

 From that discussion it appears that he certainly maintains the self to 

 be an essential factor of consciousness, consciousness being described as 

 a relation between the self and its modifications, in which the former 

 recognizes the latter. It is also proved, however, from the drift of 

 Hamilton's doctrine of the Conditioned, that he does not regard the self 

 as, in the act of consciousness, recognised by itself along with its modi- 

 fications, the belief in it being merely a subjective necessity arising from 

 the impotence of thought. The objections to this doctrine need not 

 be here reproduced; but it is not out of place to notice the attempts, 

 which have been made since Hamilton's time, at a settlement of the 

 question in dispute. We are especially called upon to notice the recent 

 discussion of the subject by Mr. MilU From repeated examination of 

 the chapter in his work on Hamilton, which is devoted to this discus- 

 sion, and to which reference has already been made, I have drawn only 

 a deepened impression of the extreme fairness with which the difficul- 

 ties of the problems discussed are appreciated and stated, even when 

 apparently in most violent collision with the author's general psycholo- 

 gical principles ; and it raises some hope of progress in the science of 

 mind, when the separate problems, presented by mental phenomena, are 

 dealt with in view of their own difliculties, rather than for the purpose 

 of working out a general theory of psychology into all its details. At 

 the same time there are formidable obstacles in the way of accepting 

 Mr. Mill's discussion as at all commensurate with the requirements of 

 the phenomenon. 



It has been already pointed out that Mr. Mill has raised a serious 



» See pp. 3'72-8, 



