OF THE SCIENCE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. 21 
carried on, and the ground upon which its principles may claim pub- 
lic attention. Let us in the first place guard against the mistake of 
attributing to the science a wider range and a greater power over 
human affairs than it can legitimately pretend to. The subject of 
political economy is wealth, under which name we include all objects 
of human desire which are capable of being appropriated. The object 
proposed by the science is to investigate the laws which regulate the 
production and distribution of wealth. It is hence obvious that 
political economy is one branch only of social science, which treats of 
whatever affects the condition of man as a social being, in order to 
determine the best means of promoting generally diffused happiness, 
In this are included government, jurisprudence, education, the treat- 
ment of criminals, sanitory regulations, the social position and rights 
of woman, and other topics of which the interest and importance are 
very great, but which, though connected together as branches of one 
great subject, and inviting attention in common, are yet sufficiently 
distinct in the kind of facts with which they are concerned, to admit 
conveniently of separate treatment. It is of course manifest in the 
first place, that if there are no absolute laws or necessary tendencies 
in respect to the acquisition and distribution of wealth, there can be 
no science of political economy. A natural law is a general expres- 
sion of facts already observed, put forth as a guide for the future, in 
order that by adapting our conduct to it we may make every availa- 
ble use of forces in operation, and may avoid the injuries arising from 
vain attempts at resisting them. The operation of a natural law is 
sometimes modified or obscured by the simultaneous action of some 
other force besides that which we are considering, but it is not the 
less real or less useful to be known. The floating or rising feather 
seems to set at defiance the law of gravitation only because it is sup- 
ported by the atmosphere or wafted by its agitations, and the philo- 
sopher feels the force of the general law as much whilst observing its 
apparent violation, as in contemplating its most striking illustrations. 
Where results depend much upon the actions of human beings, we 
know too well the variety of the motives influencing them, to expect 
perfect uniformity, but if we become acquainted with invariable tend- 
encies belonging to certain circumstances, we already possess valua- 
ble guiding principles, and inasmuch as our conclusions are only 
partially involved with human motives and dispositions, depending 
much also on laws of the external world, they have really less uncer- 
