178 JOURNAL AND PROCEEDINGS. 



2. Those connected with the representation of knowledge, in- 

 cluding (a) phantasy, (b) memory and (c) imagination. 



3. Those connected with the elaboration of knowledge, includ- 

 ing (a) conception, (b) judgment, (c) reasoning. 



Sensations may be described as mental modes or affections 

 resulting from the application of external stimuli to some part of 

 the physical organism. 



They are the primary elements of conscious life and of all 

 knowledge. But being simply an affective or subjective state 

 sensation does not in itself constitute knowledge. While however 

 sensation does not constitute knowledge, it is seen to contain an 

 element of knowledge ; since in sensation there is a tendency to 

 refer the subjective state to some non-subjective cause, which is 

 thus brought into relation with the teeling self. 



Perception, on the other hand, differs from sensation in being 

 a constructive as well as an acquisitive faculty ; for in this process 

 the ' vague data of sensation ' are first differentiated and recognized 

 as belonging to different senses. Secondly, they are supposed to be 

 at a distance from us, or given a position in time and space. 

 Thirdly, they are united into a group, and supposed to have an 

 existence independent of the perceiving mind. 



These two faculties will give us a certain form of knowledge 

 concerning present objects, brought into relation with the knowing 

 self. But they will not in themselves lead to the formation of word 

 signs; since they imply an ever present object on which the 

 attention is fixed. 



The interaction of these two faculties however will lead to an 

 additional result. Although sensations are but vague sensuous 

 affections, as states of pleasure, or pain they powerfully arouse the 

 attention and direct it in search of an external cause. Perception 

 of the non-subjective cause of the sensation having taken place, this 

 feeling of pleasure or pain at once creates an interest in the external 

 object. This done, there takes place what is known as the 

 " transference of feeling " from the knowing mind to the known 

 object. The sweetness is in the sugar not in my consciousness. 

 The mind in this way looking upon the perceived object as a 

 symbol of the subjective sensation, will have taken its first step 

 toward mental representation. Word signs, however, differ from 

 these in the fact that the association existing between the sign and 



