AN ATTEMPT AT A NEW THEORY OF HUMAN EMOTIONS. 107 



complete theory of human emotions, connecting itself naturally and 

 easily with the theory of the intellectual powers, to which I have 

 given in my adhesion, and of which, on a previous occasion, I sketched 

 the evidence. The subject would admit both of detailed analyses of 

 the various emotions which have been treated as simple independent 

 mental states, and of copious illustrations of the effects of the views 

 I have proposed, but if thus treated it would require a volume. On 

 aa occasion like the present it may suffice to indicate the effect or 

 tendency of the views proposed, so as fairly to submit them to the 

 judgment of inquirers. It will be seen that I rely first on the prin- 

 ciple that all sound philosophy of the human mind has its foundation 

 in a proper attention to the connection of the mind with the physical 

 frame. This is a subject necessarily involving much mystery ; yet it 

 is well ascertained that all mental changes belong to the nervous 

 system, and are dependent upon nervous action. The fact that states 

 simultaneously existing, whether as sensations or as ideas and whether 

 simple or complex, acquire the power of reviving each other when one 

 of them is brought up again, is certainly established by experience. 

 The explanation that this fact depends on what we call sympathy in 

 the nervous matter being a property of its nature is, perhaps it is not 

 too much to say, the only conceivable one ; and assuming this pro- 

 perty, the power of vivid mental states like pleasures and pains to 

 extend their influence beyond the nerves in which they were excited 

 to the whole frame is a natural consequence, whilst this diffusion of 

 pleasure and pain exactly corresponds with the best notion we can 

 form of emotion as distinguished from sensation or intellectual state. 

 But I beg it may be observed to what extent this explanation, if worth 

 anything, must go. It relates not to any single emotion of our nature, 

 but to the whole, in all their variety. It equally explains what are 

 termed affections — that is, permanent tendencies under certain circum- 

 stances to the prevalence and inflvxence of certain emotions moderately 

 excited — and of the strongest passions. It traces them all to the 

 influence, direct or indirect, of pleasure and pain, thus shewing the 

 great moving principle of the active part of our nature, and putting 

 us in the proper track for discovering how it can be best regulated. 

 It is commonly believed that moral sentiments constitute a distinct 

 class, arising instinctively and independently, but the theory I have 

 proposed applies to them equally with the other emotions, and their 

 analysis is as easy as that of most others. I might hence attempt to 



