PLATONIC DIALOGUES. 485 



Note V. 



2fl. To) 6vK iiooTi dpa Trepi wv dv fjirj iidrj eveiaLV d.Xrf6et.s So^ai -rrept 

 TOT/rwv wv ovK oiSev. MEN. 4>atv€Tat .... 2f2. 'Ei ovv bv dv rj 

 ypovov Kai 6v av fxr) r) avOpu>7ro<: evecrovrai dvTW dXrjOcLs So^at, di iptjyrqcm 

 eTreyep^eicrat iirta-njfjLaL yiyvoj/rat, ap' ouv tov dei )^povov iJ.€fj.aOr]KVLa iarai 

 V ^X^ dvTov.— {Meno, §§ 20, 21. Bekker). 



This passage, which Stallbaum condemns as irreconcilable with 

 the immediately preceding part of the dialogue, and as vicious in its 

 logic, is not, in my judgment, open to either of these objections. 

 Rightly interpreted, it is both in harmony with the rest of the dia- 

 logue, and (I say nothing of the principles which Plato assumes) 

 unexceptionable in its logical form. The point sought to be estab- 

 lished, is, that there never was a time, in this life or before it, when 

 the human soul had not in it true opinions, in a latent or unde- 

 veloped state — a view involving the existence of the soul throughout 

 at least all past time ; and the several steps of the argument oa 

 which this conclusion is made to rest are as follows : 



a. Learning (6 8r] p.a6rj(riv KaXovaiv dvOpwTroL) is reminiscence,, 



that is, the recovery, from within the depths of one's own 

 soul, of knowledge formerly possessed. This is supposed 

 to be proved by an experiment performed by Socrates on 

 one of Meno's attendants ; from which it appeared that 

 there were in the boy's mind true opinions regarding 

 things of which he had no knowledge (tw 6vk eiSon dpa 

 TTCjOi (1)1/ dv fJLif] iiSrj eviicnv dX.yjOa's Sofat), and that the process 

 of learning was merely the development of these latent true 

 opinions into knowledge (xai wv p-ev ye avrw ws tre.p ovap 

 dpri dvaK€Kiv7jVTaL di Bo^ac ovtoll). 



b. In a case like that of Meno's attendant, awaking, under 



the interrogations of Socrates, to a knowledge of truths of 

 which he had all his life before been ignorant, the know- 

 ledge acquired, as it was not always possessed {ovkow h aev 

 dcL itxev, del Kai 7]v iTno-n] p,uiv), and as it is seen to be not an 

 absolutely new acquisition, but merely the development of 

 what has been lying dormant in the mind, must have been 

 received at some former time ('Ap' owovTqv iTnarTrip.y)v, r]v wv 

 ovTos €;(a, rjTot iXafte ttotc rj aei it)(€v ; vat). Since, by hypo- 

 thesis, it was not received at any previous time in the 



