486 NOTES ON PASSAGES IN THE 



present life (rj SeSt8a;(€ ns tovtov yew/Acrpciv ; ouros -yap k. t. X), 

 it must have been received at a time antecedent to the pre- 

 sent life (ci 8e fxrf cv Tto vuv jSwd Xa/SoiV ovk rjSei. tovto, StjXov 

 OTi ev oAAw Tivi )(povo) iix€ Kat fjbefxaOrjKeL) . — There is a point 

 here which needs a word of explanation. If knowledge now gained 

 for the first time in the present life be old knowledge revived, the 

 knowlr)dge must unquestionably have been possessed in a former life. 

 Does this, however, imply that it must have been received in a former 

 life ? Only if we assume that the possession of knowledge is con- 

 ditioned upon the reception of it, in other words, upon an act of 

 learning. Now Plato does, in fact, make this assumption. Know- 

 ledge not being necessarily and always in the mind {ovkow it /xcv oet 

 «Xcv, det Kai tjv iTri<rTr}[jL(ov), the circumstance of its being found at 

 any time in our possession, is regarded as a result and evidence of 

 its having been received or learned. Observe the expression, ei^c kw 

 IxefiaOrjKei. He — Meno's attendant — was in possession of such and 

 such knowledge, and had learned it ; which is equivalent to : he, was 

 in possession of it through having learned it. 



c. Since («) learning is reminiscence, or the development of 



latent true opinions into knowledge ; and since {h) we had 

 knowledge, resulting from our having learned, at a time 

 antecedent to the present life, it follows, that, at a time 

 antecedent to the present life, the soul was in possession of 

 aXfjOeis So^ai, capable of being evoked into iTna-Trjfxai. 



d. Hence there never has been a time, in this life, or before it, 



when the soul was not in possession of oXij^ets 8o|^at (et 6w 

 ov dv y} )(povov Kai 6v dv /x-q rj dvOpdmos, evecovrai dvTw dXrjOei^ 

 Bo^ai, di ipunrjcrei lireycpOeiaai €7ri(TT7y/xat yiyvovrai, ap ovv rov 

 aet ^ovov fi€fJ.a6r]KVLa iarai rj ipv^rj dvTov ; SrjXov yap on rov 

 iravra )(povov ecrrtv r} ovk icrriv dvOpo}Tro<s). — Stall baum repre- 

 sents Plato as here arguing, that, because dXr)9ei<s So^ai not only are 

 in the soul now, but were in it before our birth into this world, it 

 must have possessed them always. His words are : " Animadvertea 

 autem banc argumentationem. Opiniones illas, inquit, quae inter- 

 rogando excitatae scientiam efficiunt, non in hac demum vita accipit 

 homo, sed animus secum attulit, quum in hoc corpus migraret. Quum 

 igitur illas et eo tempore habuerit, quo nondum natus erat, et easdem 

 in hac vita semper teneat, sequitur ut eas rov dec xpoi/ov susceperit." 

 Of course, nothing can be feebler than the case so put : as Stall* 



