488 NOTES ON PASSAGES IN THE 



Bufficient to warrant the conclusiou that that preceding life was the 

 sequel of one prior still, in which also the soul had true opinions in 

 it ; and so on without limit, through all past time. — Q. E. D. 



The passage which Stallbaum regards as inconsistent with that 

 which has been expounded, is the following : 'Are 6vv rj i^xn o^avaros 

 TC oucra /cat TroAAaKts yeyowia, /cat iwpaKvua /cat ra ivOaSe Kai ra iv Aibov 

 Kai TravTtt -^iqfxaTa, ovk ecrrtv 6 tl 6v fji€Kadr]K€v, wore ovSev OavfxadTOv Kai 

 irepL dpeTTj'i /cat Trept aWwv oiov re etvat dvTr]v dvajxvqa-Orjvai. a ye Kai 

 irporepov rjiriaraTO. are yap nys (^vcrews aTracn^s crvyyevovs ovotjs, Kai {xefxa- 

 drjKvia^ Tiys ij/v^r}s diravTa, ovSev KwAuet iv fxovov avajxviqaOevTa, 6 Br] [xaOyjcriv 

 KoKovcriv dvOpoiTTOL, TaXXa Travra dvTov duevpetv. — {^Meno, § 15). IStall- 

 baum's words are: " Quum enim in superiore disputatioue " (the 

 passage just quoted, the earlier of the two) "animum in alia atque 

 alia loca migrasse eoque modo omnia didicisse dixerit, ecquis est quin 

 male hie" (the passage discussed in the former part of our Note, the 

 later of the two) " affiirmari sentiat animum veras opiniones semper 

 habuisse et tenuisse?" It would be very strange if this criticism 

 were well founded. That Plato propounds, not only in the same 

 dialogu i)!it in immediate juxta-position, two flatly contradictory 

 theories on an important subject — is what we must not, except on 

 the most distinct evidence, be asked to believe. But what ground 

 is there for the charge of inconsistency ? In the earlier passage, the 

 soul, assumed to be immortal, is represented as having been often 

 generated (TroAXaKts yeyovrta) into new states of being. It is not 

 necessary to restrict the word TroAAaKts to any definite number of 

 times. The circumstance, that the frequent generation spoken of ia 

 viewed as a consequence of the soul's immortality, leads us rather 

 to suppose that an unlimited series of generations is intended. 

 Now, the doctrine that the human soul has undergone an unlimited 

 series of generations in time past, has been shewn to be necessarily 

 involved in the later passage likewise. Again, according to the 

 earlier passage, the soul, having undergone frequent generation, and 

 passed often to and from Hades, has — thus migrating "in alia atque 

 alia loca" — learned all things {6vk ia-rtv 6 tl 6v fxefiaOrjKev). Here w© 

 must by no means assume (as Stallbaum appears to have done) that 

 a learning for the first time is meant. This, of course, would be ir- 

 reconcilable with the view brought out in the later passage, that the 

 soul never was without having learned. But Plato says nothing 

 about the soul learning things for the first time. He merely says 



