PLATONIC DIALOGUES. 489 



that the soul during its past existence learned all things ; and this is 

 precisely what is taught in the later passage. For while it is there 

 demonstrated that Meno's attendant had learned geometry, and so 

 obtained an acquaintance with that science (ii-x^ Kat fi€fjLa9r]KeL) in a 

 former state of being, the remark is added, that the demonstration 

 is applicable, not to a few geometrical propositions merely, but to 

 the whole range of truth (ouros yap Troii^crei Trepi iracrr;? yew/ierpias 

 T<iuTa Tttura, Kat t(i>v dWoyv fxaOqixaTotv aTravTOiv) . 



The expression ra ivOaSe, in the earlier passage, is worthy of notice, 

 as shewing, that, when Plato wrote the Meno, he held the opinion 

 that not merely our apprehensions of eternal and immutable truths, 

 but also, in part, our mental representations of absent objects of sense, 

 are the revival of knowledge which we possessed in a former life. 

 The same thing is apparent from the words are yap tj;s ^vo-cws aTraoT^s 

 OTryyei/ou? ouo-rys .... dvrov dvevpeLv. The term ^utrts, though em- 

 ployed in a wide sense to iucludg what may be termed the universe 

 of abstract truths, cannot be taken as exclusive of the universe of 

 sensible objects ; and therefore the import of the sentence is, that, 

 since all things in nature, sensible and supra-sensible, are of kin, the 

 knowledge of any one may reawaken the knowledge which we for- 

 merly had (either in this life or in a preceding) of any other. The 

 Meno in this respect differs from the Phaedrus, where the hypothesis 

 of our possession of knowledge in a former life is advanced solely to 

 account for our apprehensions of eternal and uchangeable truth. 



Note VI. 



'Ort Trpoo-ayopevei? dvTa dvo/xota ovra irepu), j^tjcto/aev, ovofjuarL. Aeycis 

 yap dyaOa iravr hvai ra rjSea. — (Philebus, § 7. Bekker). 



From Stallbaum's remarks, quoted by Bakker, it appears that the 

 word irepdi in this passage has greatly perplexed commentators. 

 The solution of the supposed difficulty, which finds most favour with 

 Stallbaum, is, to take erepo) ovo/xan as signifying improprio nomine. 

 Should this rendering not be adopted, he would, with Heindorf, 

 change crepw into kvi ye tw. I am not able to see any reason either 

 for altering the text, or for departing from the ordinary meaning of 

 fTtpm. Protarchus has undertaken to defend the position, that plea- 

 sure is the summum bonum. In opposition to this, Socrates haa 

 urged that pleasures are various, some being very unlike others. 



