PLATONIC DIALOGUES. 491 



such sentiment as that to which Stallbaum gives expression, I ut- 

 terly deny. Though it was the opinion of Socrates himself that 

 pleasures are often bad (ws ^;u,€t? ^a/^ev), the reasoning was far from 

 being ripe for the affirmation of this as an established point, on which 

 to base the conclusion, that pleasures ought not to be called indis- 

 criminately communi boni nomine. In fact, as has been already 

 brought out, Socrates neither expected nor asked Protarchus to 

 admit that pleasures are in every case bad. 



Note VII. 



Kai TraXiv ctti rqv twv rjhovwv irrjyrjv Ireov. ws yap 8ievorj6r]fjiev dvra? 

 Iivyvwai, Ttt TOiv dXrjOijov fiopia irpwrov, ovk i^eyevrjOr] 17yu.1v, aAAa 8ta to 

 -jraxrav ayairav iTnaTrjfjLrjv ets ravrov fxeOeijxev dOpoa<; Kai irpocrOc tojv 

 ^Sovwv. — {Fhilebus, § 149. Bekker.) 



Stallbaum declares this passage to be " aperte mutilatus." It 

 seems that Heindorf also was troubled in his mind regarding it ; for 

 Stallbaum mentions, towards the conclusion of his note on the sub- 

 ject, that, after having committed his own views to writing, he ob- 

 tained a sight of the " exemplar Platonis Heindorfiauum," and 

 found written on the margin over against the passage : " Locus 

 mancus videtur, nee sine libris MSS. explendus." Heindorf 's cor- 

 rection of i^eyevero for i^eyevrjOr], approved by Stallbaum, should pro- 

 bably be received ; but I am convinced, in opposition to these emi- 

 nent men, that no further emendation is necessary. 



In order that the passage may be understood, some explanation 

 must be given as to what precedes. It has been proved that neither 

 a life of intellect without pleasure, nor a life of pleasure without in- 

 tellect, is desirable ; but that the life which is to possess the cha- 

 racter of ffood in the highest degree must be one in which intellect 

 and pleasure are conjoined. The question then arises : in what way 

 are pleasures, and the various kinds of knowledge, to be mingled 

 together, so as to produce the most desirable life ? By a lively re- 

 presentation, Socrates imagines himself standing beside two foun- 

 tains ; the one of Pleasure — a fountain of honey ; the other of In- 

 tellect — a sober fountain of salubrious water ; and, like some oivoxoo^, 

 he has to compound the most desirable life out of the ingredients 

 contained in these fountains. He proceeds with his task as follows. 



a. First, he asks : Shall every species of pleasure be mingled to- 



