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THE NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE 



strong currents beating- on this rocky 

 shore, and the frequent storms, made 

 the navigation of this part of the Atlan- 

 tic so dangerous for saihng ships that it 

 was not ordinarily attempted. Indeed, 

 the voyage around those islands is still 

 so dangerous that modern steamships 

 avoid it whenever possible, and the Eng- 

 lish themselves, who know these waters 

 well, have recently lost a great ocean 

 liner in the attempt to go around the 

 Isles. 



The only practicable approach for 

 oceanic trade to the good harbors of 

 northern Europe lay through the Chan- 

 nel, where geography furnished the Eng- 

 lish with peculiar advantages. That 

 small body of water is agitated by cross- 

 currents of all sorts and varieties, is 

 swept by cross-winds, and always offers 

 difficulties to sailing ships. Eor many 

 centuries the average sailing ship did not 

 attempt to ride out a storm at sea, but 

 tried to keep near enough some harbor 

 to be able to put in if necessary. This 

 was, in fact, an established principle of 

 navigation, and the English themselves 

 were the first to change it. 



The only harbors along the Channel 

 which ships could usually make in mo- 

 ments of peril were on the English coast, 

 and the shipping of northern Europe on 

 its way up and down the Channel hugged 

 the English shore and ran into English 

 harbors whenever necessary. These 

 facts, together with the strength of the 

 English fleet and the ability of the Eng- 

 lish sailors, promptly put her in a posi- 

 tion to control the world's commerce. 



One of the most interesting illustra- 

 tions of the power of the Channel ap- 

 peared in the sixteenth century, when a 

 Spanish treasure-ship laden with money 

 to pay the Duke of Alva's soldiers, who 

 were on the verge of mutiny for the lack 

 of it, with money, too, which Philip II 

 had borrowed with great difficulty and at 

 extortionate interest, was compelled to 

 put into an English port by a storm. 

 The Channel actually placed in Eliza- 

 beth's hands an advantage over her foe 

 which she could have obtained in no 

 other way, actually forced her foe to 

 come in of his own free will, so to speak, 

 and put himself at her mercy. She car- 



ried the gold to London for "safe-keep- 

 ing." 



These natural factors, which made the 

 naval control of the Channel a simple 

 matter for England, also made England 

 the normal and ideal exchange center for 

 the domestic and international trade of 

 northern Europe. It all had to pass Eng- 

 land's door. Besides, the inferior size of 

 England, her lack of military strength, 

 her isolation, made the northern people 

 prefer a trade center at London, because 

 it was safe from interference by the Eu- 

 ropean nations themselves. 



PRACTicALivY i;ve;ry fe:ature: of mari- 

 time architecture: originated 

 by the british race 



The rise of England as a maritime and 

 colonial power is too well known to make 

 it essential here to do more than point 

 out the fact that the character of inter- 

 national trade made its monopoly com- 

 paratively simple in the days of sailing 

 ships and slow communication. Until 

 the steamships appeared, ocean freights 

 remained too expensive and uncertain for 

 the shipment of the types of bulky ma- 

 terials — grain, coal, iron, and the like — 

 which now form so large a part of the 

 world's commerce. International trade 

 was for centuries a trade in luxuries 

 which were not producible in Europe at 

 all, and were, in fact, almost exclusively 

 natural products of the East or West 

 Indies. Muslins, silks, and spices were 

 the staples during the Middle Ages, and 

 to this list the discoveries of the sixteenth 

 and seventeenth centuries added sugar, 

 tobacco, tea, coffee, and the like. Such 

 a trade could be monopolized simply 

 enough by controlling the sources of sup- 

 ply, which were, of course, relatively few. 



When the English saw that the defeat 

 of the Armada had made them supreme 

 upon the sea, they realized that the mo- 

 nopoly of the international carrying trade 

 was a possibility and might conceivably 

 make England the wealthiest country in 

 Europe. The fleet therefore became to 

 them something more than a defensive 

 weapon. Upon its supremacy would 

 hang this monopoly, and they, accord- 

 ingly, promptly picked quarrels with the 

 Dutch, who were then their greatest 



