On Definitions. 29 



in such individuals of the human race as might meet together, un- 

 acquainted with each other's language, or unacquainted with the use 

 of any language whatever. 



If we imagine two human beings to meet together, after having 

 grown to the age of manhood, without having ever had the opportu- 

 nity of exercising the faculty of speech, having till then lived in ab- 

 solute solitude : if we imagine them both, upon this rencounter, to 

 be actuated by the impulse to make known their desires and feelings 

 to each other : in such a case it is difficult, or perhaps impossible, 

 for us to say which of the senses these two individuals would select 

 as the instrument of their communications. We, from the fullest 

 experience, know that the voice and the ear are by far the most ef- 

 ficacious ; but what time might elapse before the two individuals in 

 question would stumble upon this discovery, it is impossible for us to 

 form the slightest conjecture. From the observations and practice 

 of those who are engaged in the tiuly humane task of communicating 

 to the dumb the blessings of social intercourse, it should seem that 

 the looks, the hands and the eyes, would, for no inconsiderable pe- 

 riod, continue to be the principal means for maintaining such inter- 

 change of thought, as in such a state could be practiced. 



But, passing over this part of the subject as the region of mere 

 conjecture, let us consider the case of two persons meeting, who 

 were unacquainted with each other's language, but having each his 

 own language, and consequently vi^ell aware that words, or speech 

 of some kind or other, were by far the readiest means of maintaining 

 social intercourse. In such a case, how would they proceed to the 

 adoption of such terms as both might understand ? No satisfactory 

 conversation, it is manifest, could be carried on, till they came to be 

 agreed as to the meaning and force of such a number of terms, as 

 might be sufficient to express their more common thoughis and in- 

 tentions. 



It is easy to perceive that the first names which would be adopted 

 by common agreement between the persons thus situated, would be 

 the names of external objects, of such objects as could be seen or 

 pointed at, or which could be felt, or smelt, or tasted. About the 

 names of such objects there could be no difficulty in coming to an 

 agreement. The presence of the object itself would easily remove 

 all ambiguity, and might at any time be referred to, when any doubt 

 might arise. In this way the names of trees, plants, animals of ev- 

 ery description, rivers, fields, hills, of different kinds of food, and of 



