32 On Definitions. 



that we can have no knowledge of things which are not objects of 

 sense. If that doctrine be correct, or have any foundation at all, we 

 must henceforth abandon all reasoning upon such things as gratitude, 

 love, fear, happiness, loyalty, treason, falsehood. These are not 

 objects of sense. They can never be submitted to the eye, the ear, 

 or the touch. 



To us who admit the existence of things which cannot be seen, 

 it is competent to state, that there are two methods, by which, along 

 with great care and attention, we may arrive at some knowledge of 

 the feelings of others, and consequently agree upon some terms 

 which may represent them in conversation. The first method is, 

 to judge of the effect by the cause which produced it ; and the se- 

 cond is, to judge of cause by the effect which we see produced ; 

 and comparing both with what we remember to have happened to 

 ourselves. If one of the two persons above supposed, had chanced 

 to have his hand severely bruised by a stone, we all know what the 

 effect would be : he would suffer much pain. This would be the 

 first effect. The second would be, to cry, to make wry faces, to 

 jump, and to shed tears ; for he could not yet have learned the pro- 

 priety of suppressing these modes of giving vent to his emotions. 

 If we now suppose, that in the course of time his wound is healed, 

 and all his pains removed ; and after sometime farther, his compan- 

 ion meets with a similar accident ; it is now tolerably easy for the 

 first sufferer, if his memory be at all correct, to understand from what 

 has happened, what must be the painful situation of his friend : he 

 judges of the effect by the cause which produced it. It is equally 

 easy for him to derive the same conclusion from the groans and cries 

 which he hears, from the contortions and tears which he sees, and 

 all which he understands from his own experience : he judges of the 

 cause (his friend's painful situation) from the effects which it pro- 

 duced. During the conversations to which these two painful inci- 

 dents would give occasion, it is easy to see that suitable names and 

 terms would come to be employed, which, on all* future occasions, 

 would serve to designate the mental situations that had been de- 

 veloped. 



Such are the only two methods, as far as I can discover, by which 

 the thoughts and feelings of one mind may be laid open to another. 

 They are both indirect and imperfect ; and nature affords no direct 

 communication between minds. They both proceed upon the ad- 

 mission of several principles, which, in the operation, are taken for 



