274 On Definitions. 



prehended under the following classes, the impressions made upon 

 the mind by external objects, the capacities or habits of mind in 

 judging of these, and the principles of action which we form. For 

 examples of these, we may mention gratitude, or the feeling arising 

 from receiving a favor ; memory, or the record of past impressions ; 

 and fortitude, or the determination to bear suffering with firmness. 

 They are moral and intellectual impressions, or virtuous resolutions, 

 and the contrary. Now the manner of ascertaining or limiting the 

 signification of such terms, can scarcely be any other than the natu- 

 ral method of doing so, described in the former part of this paper. 

 It must be, principally and almost solely, by observing the causes by 

 which they are produced, and the conduct, actions and behavior to 

 which they lead. These are the only two ways which we have for 

 obtaining any knowledge of what passes in the minds of others. 

 They are, for that reason, almost the only means which we have 

 for discovering the sense and meaning of the terms employed by 

 others. Having felt a very strong feeling of aversion, (excited in 

 my mindy) when something is imputed to me which 1 despise, and 

 of which I deem myself incapable, I give to that feeling the name 

 of indignation. And if I afterwards witness another person suffer- 

 ing from the same cause, I give to his feeling the same name, and I 

 never entertain any doubt that the feehng is of the same kind, of the 

 same general nature, although it may differ in many subordinate par- 

 ticulars. I argue from cause to effect. But the cause may vary in- 

 definitely, as to its extent, and therefore so also must the effect. 

 Again, if I observe a person speaking ill of another, and can, upon 

 inquiry, find no good ground that he had for doing so, I here reason 

 from the effect to the cause, and consider him as entertaining an in- 

 tention to injure the other, without proper reason. I give to his con- 

 duct the name of slander. This term serves for ever after to desig- 

 nate this crime ; but the guilt which we necessarily attach to it, va- 

 ries through every possible degree, from the slightest disapprobation 

 up to the most consummate detestation. These two examples serve 

 to show how moral names are applied, limited, and defined. They 

 also serve to exemplify the ever varying nature of moral qualitieSy 

 which, Aristotle has long ago repeatedly mentioned, renders that 

 branch of knowledge for ever unsusceptible of scientific demonstra- 

 tion. In geometry, if two lines are shown to be parallel, they must 

 possess all the properties of parallel lines. There can be neither 

 exception nor degree. But in morals, good actions exist or are per- 



