REVIEWS RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY, ETC. 349 



the history of speculation, of a shifting succession of systems, is by 

 no means inconsistent with the idea of real and great progress. If 

 the various metaphysical theories which, to a superficial observer, ap- 

 pear to resemble the wild beasts in the vision of the prophet Daniel, 

 each rising out of the sea to displace its predecessor : if these theories 

 be carefully examined, they will for the most part be found to recog- 

 nize important, though partial, truths ; their mutual antagonism re- 

 sulting either from the presence of error in all the systems, or from 

 the denial, on the part of one system, of the truth contained in the 

 others. The history of philosophy may consequently be read as a 

 history, not of conflicting but of conspiring systems. As speculation 

 is continued from age to age, what is erroneous in the several partial 

 systems tends to drop away, having no principle of enduring life ; 

 while the really valuable elements survive, and are gradually drawn 

 together into a harmonious and beautiful union ; giving rise to what 

 Mr. Fraser calls, in contradistinction to the partial or sectarian sys- 

 tems, the true CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHY. Of course, these ideas 

 are not new ; but, in the treatise before us, they are presented and 

 illustrated in an unusually felicitous manner. 



Professor Fraser is an adherent of the modern Scottish school of 

 philosophy — more briefly, a Hamiltonian ; though he does not by any 

 means slavishly follow his illustrious predecessor. It being kept in 

 view that the great problem which rational philosophy seeks to solve, 

 is, " to determine what is meant at bottom by the so-called real exis- 

 tence which appears in innumerable forms, which every human action 

 assumes, and on which life reposes," the following may be taken as a 

 summary of the principal points in Mr. Fraser's metaphysical creed, 

 (a). Real existence is ultimately incomprehensible by finite intelli- 

 gence. Consequently, the grand problem of metaphysics is insoluble. 

 What that real existence is, of which, in some of its phenomena or 

 varying manifestations, we are perpetually conscious, man cannot 

 know, cannot conceive. This doctrine is opposed, on the one hand, 

 to the theories of those who believe that the problem can be positively 

 solved : in other words, that we are capable of attaining to a know- 

 ledge of real existence ; and, on the other hand, to the scepticism 

 which represents reason as self-contradictory — in which case no con- 

 clusion of any kind would be possible ; not even the conclusion that 

 the problem is insoluble, (b.) Though real existence is ultimately in- 

 comprehensible by finite intelligence, certain of its phenomena or 

 varying manifestations may be apprehended in consciousness. For 



