350 REVIEWS RATIONAL. PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY, ETC. 



instance, in every act of sensitive perception, mind and matter, the 

 ego and the non-ego, are phenomenally apprehended together. Only 

 a small pant, indeed, of the universe lies within the sphere of our im- 

 mediate perception, or is actually presented to consciousness ; but the 

 phenomena of the universe which are not actually, may he made 

 virtually, present to consciousness ; being " brought within the sphere 

 of intelligible belief by means of the' representative faculty, and an 

 inductive comparison of instances." (c). The phenomena of real 

 existence, actually or virtually present to consciousness, are temporal ; 

 that is, of finite duration. " Real existence, when perceived, must be 

 perceived as something which appears on the stream of time ; when 

 merely conceived, it must be conceived as something manifested in 

 time." (c?). Since real existence can thus be apprehended only in 

 some finite and transient manifestation, it might seem at first sight as 

 though we never could have any ground for introducing into a system 

 of metaphysical doctrine anything regarding real existence, non- 

 phenomenal, absolute, infinite. And, indeed, it is true that the infinite 

 cannot be grasped by consciousness, or an intelligible knowledge of it 

 reached by deduction from what consciousness reveals. Yet we can- 

 not but believe in the real as something above consciousness. Such 

 faith, far from being irrational, is the only true rationalism ; for our 

 intellectual constitution contains among its elements a variety of be- 

 liefs, (commonly called transcendental), essentially incomprehensible, 

 yet irresistibly forcing themselves upon the mind ; so that " we are 

 impelled to the infinite by faith," while nevertheless "we are 

 repelled from the infinite by thought." (e). According to the view 

 just given, the doctrine of insoluble Realism is built (as, in fact, every 

 non-sceptical system of philosophy must at least profess to be) upon a 

 recognition of the validity of the common beliefs of mankind, even 

 when these are, or may be deemed to be, incomprehensible. And Mr. 

 Fraser considers, that, as respects practice, " the spontaneous feelings 

 and tendencies of human nature, regulated by our moral and religious 

 trust" are " an available substitute for an intelligible theory of exis- 

 tence ;" (no such theory, in his opinion, being capable of being 

 framed). Here the canon of metaphysical presumption is laid down, 

 viz. : that " a common belief may be presumed to be true until it is 

 disproved." (/). If the great aim of speculation be to determine 

 what at bottom is meant by the real existence which every human ac- 

 tion assumes ; and if, as our author thinks, this problem be insoluble : 

 what purpose, it may be asked, beyond that of exercising and whetting 



