REVIEWS RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY, ETC. 351 



the intellectual energies, does speculation serve? A two-fold purpose. 

 In the first place, it repels the attacks of scepticism. In Mr. Fraser's 

 opinion, the germs of scepticism — scepticism as to all that ennobles man, 

 or that man holds dear — are latent in every theory which professes to 

 explain existence ; and not only so, but it is from the assumption that 

 • an intelligible theory of existence can be framed, and from the contra- 

 dictions in which such an assumption issues, that scepticism in any 

 instance derives its plausibility. If this be so, it is certainly of im- 

 mense moment that the insolubility of the great problem of meta- 

 physics should be scientifically made out. In the second place, the 

 conviction, formally arrived at after many a weary effort to penetrate 

 the mystery of existence, that we must believe, yet never can com- 

 prehend — that " knowledge" (as our author, ia something of the 

 spirit and tone of Pascal, beautifully expresses it) " must hang sus- 

 pended, on the wings of Faith and Love, over a dark gulf which the 

 line of reason cannot fathom" — this conviction, it is supposed, must 

 exert upon the soul a direct influence of the most salutary kind ; par- 

 ticularly in the way of fostering a spirit of humility and reverence. 



Such, in brief outline, is Mr. Fraser's system of rational philosophy ; 

 and we are constrained to confess, that, with our present convictions, 

 we cannot assent to it. "Whether we can produce a better system, is 

 another question. Perhaps, in due time, we may try. But mean- 

 while, without undertaking the responsibility of expounding and de- 

 fending a metaphysical theory different from that of our author, we 

 may (especially in view of the matured treatise, of which Mr. Fraser's 

 present production comes forth as the herald) be allowed to indicate 

 some of the points in which we regard his doctrine as unsatisfactory. 



The most objectionable — as it is the most obvious — feature in the 

 system, is, that, on Mr. Fraser's principles, we can have no strict and 

 perfect certainty that anything real exists, beyond the phenomena ot 

 consciousaess. The real, as distinguished from its temporal and 

 changing phenomena, is not consciously apprehended. It cannot be 

 conceived or known by the finite mind. We are, no doubt, impelled 

 to exercise faith in its existence — a faith which Mr. Fraser elo- 

 quently iisists that it would be in the highest degree unphilosophi- 

 cal to gi^e up. Still, when we look into the matter, we find that 

 after all h? does not profess to claim for this faith an absolute validity, 

 such as diaracterizes the knowledge which we have of the pheno- 

 mena of Being. We do not suppose that Mr. Fraser would com- 

 plain tha; the statement now made is inaccurate ; but lest any of 



