REVIEWS — RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY, ETC. 353 



absolute certainty that any such reality exists ; compels us, in a 

 word, to admit, that there is no strict and absolute certainty of the 

 existence of anything, save the fleeting images that follow one 

 another in the glass of consciousness. Now this doctrine we are 

 utterly unable to assent to. If Mr. Fraser, when he publishes his 

 system in its matured and extended form, can bring forward any 

 considerations to remove our dislike to it, we shall weigh them care- 

 fully ; but in the mean time, we cling to the persuasion that man 

 has something more than a "presumption" of absolute existence. 

 We cannot divest ourselves of the impression that Mr. Eraser's 

 opinion is closely allied to that very scepticism against which he is 

 so anxious to raise a barrier. Instead of the canon of metaphysical 

 presumption, we would lay down the principle, that the truth of the 

 common beliefs of mankind is perfectly and essentially certain ; that 

 no one of these beliefs can even be conceived false ; and that a ques- 

 tion as to their validity cannot be intelligibly raised. We are mis- 

 taken, if an examination of our various common beliefs in detail 

 would not bear us out in affirming this principle — a principle, which, 

 if it could indeed be demonstrated to be correct, would be fatal to 

 the most important and distinctive parts of Mr. Eraser's metaphysi- 

 cal theory. 



We suspect that it is for want of an investigation into the nature 

 of our common beliefs, that the doctrine which Mr. Fraser has laid 

 down respecting their validity, and which is the common doctrine of 

 metaphysicians of the Scottish school, has obtained currency. Take, 

 for instance, the causal belief — to which reference has already been 

 made. What is this belief? As far as we can gather, Mr. Eraser 

 looks upon it as a pure inexplicable mental mode — a mode, as Pro- 

 fessor Ferrier, of St. Andrews, might say, of the ego per se. Were 

 this the case, we should, of course, be shut up to Mr. Eraser's con- 

 clusion respecting its validity. A pure mental mode has no essen- 

 tial and necessary connection — as far as we can see — with anything 

 else. Were the causal belief, therefore, a pure mental mode, we 

 could go no further than " presume" the accuracy of its testimony 

 to what is not included in its own subjective existence. Strict cer- 

 tainty, as distinguished from mere presumption, would, on such an 

 hypothesis, be impossible. But, for our part, we do not regard either 

 the causal belief, or any of the other cognitions, beliefs, &c., of the 

 mind, in the light mentioned. On the contrary, our impression is 



