THOUGHTS ON BKXIEF AND EVIDENCE. 233 



may not be entirely unworthy of notice, though much study of what 

 has been written since my inquiries would be necessary to enable me 

 to make them what I would wish. The importance of the subject no 

 one will question, and, probably, the most generally received notions 

 are much at variance with those I shall present. 



Most people think that they know very well what is meant by 

 belief, yet such is the looseness with which language is employed that 

 there are really several distinct states of. mind, which, in accordance 

 with approved custom, are designated by this name, and of this fact 

 few seem to be aware. 



Belief in a mathematical theorem, in a scientific generalization or 

 natural law, in a series of facts or events not perceived by our own 

 senses, in the occurrence of some change as the consequent to a 

 known antecedent, and in the existence of what we have perceived by 

 our own senses, is by no means produced in all these cases by the 

 same process, nor is the state of mind produced identical. Somewhat 

 different still is the belief in various opinions impressed upon our 

 minds in early years, or communicated to us by those around U8, 

 of which most of us have never properly examined the sources or 

 grounds, although the feeling of believing them may be strong. It 

 may be worth while to examine these cases somewhat particularly, 

 that we may observe how they differ in their origin and nature. We 

 will begin with what seems simplest, the case of our own sensations 

 present or past. We are so constituted as to experience sensations in 

 certain combinations, and in a certain order, as we say, from external 

 objects ; though some philosophers contend that we know the sensa- 

 tions, and do not know their external causes, which, they allege, that 

 "We believe in without reason. However this may be, we have the 

 sensations, and to have them is to believe them. The belief is not a 

 consequence of having them, or the result of the application to them 

 of some faculty or some mental process, but it is the very state itself 

 of experiencing them. When we say we believe them, we mean nothing 

 more or different from saying that we have them. No evidence could 

 possibly be offered to convince us that we have them if they are not 

 part of our consciousness. As to their having external material causes, 

 an invariable association in all human minds refers them to such, or, 

 in other words, the state which we call the perception of externality 

 of objects arises from certain clusters of sensations in all minds ; and 

 those who argue against the existence of the causes have the same 



