236 THOUGHTS ON BELIEF AND EVIDENCE. 



cliances of being deceived, which weak fear or a reproachful conscience 

 multiply. It appears plainly, from what has been said, that, in all 

 ordinary cases, we are not liable to be deceived by our senses. We 

 have sensations, and to have them is to believe them. Disease and 

 peculiar excitement may, occasionally, create difficulties ; but, as a 

 rule, where sense is concerned, no evidence beyond its own action is 

 needed or could add to its force. 



Remembered sensations differ very little from present sensations in 

 respect to the nature of our belief in them. Past events which passed 

 immediately in our own view, and directly affected ourselves or those 

 in whom we were interested, especially supposing them to have been 

 of such a character as at the time to produce a vivid impression, are 

 frequently revived as ideas in our minds, in such a manner as to have 

 a distinct place in a series of ideas forming our consciousness of the 

 past. In such a case we cannot have the ideas without belief in the 

 occurrence of the events. The memory is revived consciousness, and 

 its existence constitutes our belief. It is true that although the kind 

 of confidence we have in our remembrances is the same as we have in 

 our sensations, i e., their forming a part of our actual consciousness, 

 yet the degree differs because, whilst it is very rarely that there caa 

 be any pretence for questioning our sensations, the gradual fading 

 away of remembrances, and the degree in which other mental states 

 may become associated with them so as to alter their character, oblige* 

 us to make certain allowances, and in some instances to assure our- 

 selves of the correctness of memory by the conjunction of two or more 

 remembrances, or by other independent means. The precaution* 

 necessary in this way need not be discussed at present. 



We proceed then to the consideration of the nature and grounds of 

 onr belief in states or changes of external objects not falling within 

 the range of our own senses. These can become known to us only by 

 having been perceived by the senses of our fellow-creatures and com-^ 

 municated to us by the instrumentality of language — that is to say, 

 they are known to us by testimony, and we have to inquire why we 

 believe testimony ; whether such belief is reasonable, and if so what 

 limits ought to be placed to it, or what cautions are needed to prevent 

 our being misled. The full consideration of these subjects would 

 require a large treatise, but the guiding principles are not very difficult 

 to indicate and will answer the purpose of our present inquiry. Other 

 men, like ourselves, believe in their own sensations, and cannot help 



