THOUGHTS ON BTELIEF AND EVIDENCE. 237 



believing in them, nor does any doubt affect them "which would not 

 equally affect our sensations, respecting which we cannot admit 

 doubt. If, then, we could be sure in each case of having communi- 

 cated to us the sensations experienced by fellow-men and nothing 

 more, the sources of error would be limited indeed, and we might 

 place an almost implicit reliance upon testimony. Why, then, do we 

 not do so 1 Why do we believe at all if not to the fullest extent ? 

 What are the principles which should reasonably guide us on the 

 subject, since universal scepticism would be manifest folly and would 

 stop all the pursuits of life, and to believe or reject according to 

 momentary fancy would be quite as unjustifiable ? Some tell us that 

 we believe in testimony by instinct, and learn to modify and regulate 

 our belief by experience. I cannot think the use of the term instinct 

 proper in such a connection, but it seems to be true that our first ten- 

 dency is to believe testimony and not less so that experience wisely 

 used regulates without destroying this belief. The primary and 

 natural purpose of language is to communicate our states of mind to 

 others, making known our wants and desires, our hopes and fears, and 

 as it were transferring to them our sensations and thoughts, either 

 through sympathy or as affording reasons for their acting according 

 to our wishes. Where there is no strong purpose to the contrary, 

 we speak truth naturally, and because our own words are intended 

 to convey our perceptions, feelings and desires, and we all hear' 

 from others a great deal more truth than falsehood we are as natu^ 

 rally disposed to believe : but because where there is no moral 

 control in the mind, selfishness would dispone to falsehood, and 

 we all find ourselves occasionally deceived ; a certain am.ount of 

 distrust is gradually created by observation of what passes around 

 us. There are also other sources of difficulty : testimony ordina- 

 rily communicates, not single sensations or definite clusters of 

 them, which would leave little room for doubt or confusion in 

 the mind of the witness, but series of successive events which were 

 hastily viewed from one point of view and which would be rendered 

 obscure either by his indifference or his agitation of mind ; frequeiitl? 

 too sufficient time has elapsed to admit of a partial fading of the 

 events from the memory, whilst in an attempt to recall them, suppos- 

 ing no intention to deceive, desire and emotion would modify the 

 result, giving colour to the narration. We may easily observe in our 

 own minds the difference there is in clearness of revival between a 



