334 On Iiifiiiites. 



Mr. Fisher observes, when remarking on the possibihty 

 of an eternal creation as an effect of Divine power, " if 

 there be any seeming inconsistency in (he lan*i;uage eternal 

 ejfect. we may call it an eternal existence dependent on an- 

 other eternal existence, in such manner, that if the latter 

 had never existed, the former never would. I have some- 

 times illustrated it to myself in this manner. Suppose a 

 straight rod to begin at the earth and to stretch towards the 

 north. Let it be supposed immoveable, but that all other 

 matter gravitates in liiies at right angles to it, and tends to 

 fall away fiom it. A chain may be hung parallel to this 

 rod, by means of wire? placed at moderate distances. It is 

 self-evident, that the chain may be supported to as great a 

 distance as the rod stretches ; and therefore if the rod 

 stretches to infinity, it will support a chain of intinite 

 length. The analogy of extension to duration admits this 

 conclusion to be extended with intuitive clearness to the 

 latter." To some it may perhaps appear necessary, that 

 if the agent and the work are coeternal, the volition and 

 the effect must be in all cases contemporaneous. But if 

 the agent has been eternal, and if he has been eternally at 

 work, and if we admit the necessity in every case of a time 

 intervening between the volition and the effect, we see 

 with certainty that the admission involves no difficulty ex- 

 cept with regard to the original act. But the supposed 

 original act of a being eternally at work is an absurdity. 

 To those however who still consider it indispensable (hat 

 the volition and the effect should be coincident with regard 

 to duration, it may be answered, that so they might be. If 

 it be said that the Deity necessarily requires any time in 

 which to perform one of his operations, that time may be 

 expressed by a finite number, or infinitesimal. But to say 

 that he cannot perform aii operation in a less time than a 

 given one, is virtually to say that his power is limited. It 

 will doubtless be objected, that if the work of creation has 

 been eternal, then some one portion of the universe must 

 alone have been eternal, and therefore could not have been 

 created. This portion the mind perceives must have been 

 the original one. But the original unit of an eternal series 

 is an absurdity. Besides if such an argument is admissible, 

 it will equally well disprove infinite duration and infinite 

 space. For it is obvious that in past duration, any point 

 whatever may be assumed by a finite mind ; but it sees 



