Universal Terms. 21 



doctrine of the Nominalists, that we can neither speculate nor reason 

 concerning universals without words, is erroneous. 



Artificial classifications are composed of objects which, not resem- 

 bling each other in appearance, are yet ranked together from some 

 principle of resemblance, or some resembling relation. Such words 

 as subjects, things, articles, agents, and generally the technical terms 

 of the sciences, express artificial classifications. In the use of these 

 words, we believe, with the Nominalists, that no image in the mind 

 corresponds to them, that when we reason or speculate by their aid 

 our attention is occupied with the words themselves, much in the 

 manner in which it is given to the signs and letters of an algebraical ' 

 process; and with regard to these, we also consider the theory of the 

 Nominalists concerning the formation of universals true; and that the 

 third step of the process introduced b)' Dr. Brown is here incorrect. 

 To invent, arrange and define, in this department, constitutes no 

 inconsiderable portion of the labors of science and philosophy. That 

 man is endowed with a capacity to go on forming classifications more 

 and more general, in one of the most wonderful and useful parts of 

 his nature, contributing perhaps more than any other faculty, as Mr. 

 Stewart has ably shown, to the continual advancement of the species. 



Botany affords an excellent illustration of the different kinds of class- 

 es supposed ; the system of Jussieu expressing the natural, that of 

 Linnaeus the artificial. How could Linnaeus have made his classifi- 

 cation, unless he had invented terms? Or who can say, that -in refer- 

 ence to calling up ideas, it is the same thing whether we use the words 

 Monandria, Diandria, &lc. or mention roses, grape-vines and oaks. 



We now bring forward what we consider inconteslible proof that 

 we have, with regard to natural classes, general conceptions. Con- 

 ception is, by definition, a transcript of perception, and we think it 

 can be shown that we have general perceptions. A hawthorn bush 

 is before me. Who will say that every one of its white blossoms 

 and green leaves is to me an individual subject of consideration? and 

 that the reason of their being ranked under the same head is because 

 that in the infancy of language some person, happening to become ac- 

 quainted with one hawthorn blossom or leaf gave it this name, and 

 afterwards finding others which agreed in appearance with it he call- 

 ed them by the same name ? 



On the contrary, nature presents these objects before us, not sin- 

 gle, but in groups, and we see them generally, as many objects of 

 the same kind, and as such afterwards conceive of them. The same 

 thing occurs in numberless classes of objects, especially in things con- 



