22 Universal Terms. 



siderably smaller than ourselves. Nor does it at all afleci the nature 

 of the argument, if we find that individuals of a class sometimes, from 

 certain peculiarities, so strike the mind as to be recalled, as such, 

 among numbers.pf undistinguishable similar things. 



To illustrate farther the subject of general perceptions, and its 

 bearing on the question proposed : suppose you are seated in a con- 

 templative mood, at the hour when twilight is giving place to dark- 

 ness — a frightened child enters — you enquire the cause of his fears. 

 As I was coming, says he, a man suddenly started from behind a tree. 

 What man? Indeed, I do not know; it was so dark that I could not 

 distinguish whether he was white or black ; all that I could see was 

 that it was a man. But what tree was it? I cannot tell that either; 

 1 merely remarked that it. was a tree, but could not distinguish of what 

 kind ; but I know that I saw a man and a tree ; I have them now in 

 my mind. The possibility of such an occurrence none will dispute. 

 The child then had actual perception of a tree and a man in general, 

 and of course its transcript conception ; and he needed no name of 

 the thing or sort of thing conceived, to reason or speculate concern- 

 ing it, so far as regarded his own mind, though without words he 

 could not communicate his conceptions to others. That we do, even 

 in such cases, use words in our mental operations, there is no doubt, 

 but is it not owing chiefly to our social nature ? We delight in fan- 

 cied conversations with those we love. We like to contend with 

 those who give us an opportunity to display our wit, in our own men- 

 tal field, where we are sure of the victory ; or if startled friendship 

 sees tokens of moral aberration, we plan the pathetic address which 

 shall recall the wanderer to virtue. Hence we perpetually use words 

 in our thoughts, not always because we cannot think without them, 

 but because we perpetually recur to the communication of our 

 thoughts to others. 



The perception of things according to their general characteristic 

 marks, is what always occurs when objects are seen at certain dis- 

 tances, or by dim lights. When we look up a long street or avenue, 

 we may see hundreds of human beings whom we know to be men, 

 women and children, merely by means of general characters. The 

 size of the objects is to be regarded, when we treat of the distances 

 at which we cease to distinguish by particular marks. But how 

 should we ever recognise new objects, as belonging to certain class- 

 es, but by their correspondence to our general ideas. Can it be 

 doubted that the deaf and dumb as perfectly conceive of men, horses, 

 trees, &-c. as classes of objects, as those who know their names in va- 



