On the process of Memory. 2^7-8- 



confined, that it is excited to action by a stroke, a jar, or by any sud- 

 den and vivid emotion. The ear, too, has the elements of sound so 

 much at command, independent of any external cause, that a slight 

 disorder or irregularity of the parts in or about the ear, will often 

 produce the sensation of sound as vividly, as if an impression were 

 really made upon the eaj- by the action of an external object. Jt is 

 well known that the other organs of sense are not near so suscepti- 

 ble of seeming sensations, without the actual influence of external 

 causes. The organs of touch may be thought an exception ; but 

 the sensations caused by internal pain, are very different from those 

 produced by external objects, on the organs of touch. May it not 

 be owing to these facts that the senses of seeing and hearing, are 

 more concerned in dreams, than the other senses ? 



The action of the mind, then, in recollection or memory, is the 

 same as in observation or perception ; and there is, perhaps, a slight 

 probability, that the mind goes farther, in some cases, and produces 

 on the organs of sense, the phenomena of actual sensation. It is an 

 interesting question, why the mind acts in one way, rather than 

 another ; or why the attention of the mind seems directed toward 

 one object, rather than another ? This question is best answered by 

 well known facts ; that the mind acts most readily in that way in 

 which it has before acted the oftenest and most intensely; that those 

 sensations are reproduced most readily, by the mind, which have 

 been before the most frequent and the most vivid ; or that the atten- 

 tion of the mind is most easily directed to those seeming objects, 

 toward which it has been the oftenest and most earnestly directed. 

 Now, all this would be well and simply called mental habit. On 

 habit, too, much of association is plainly dependent. The mind goes 

 from one thing to another, in a particular train, simply because it has 

 done so before. Philosophical association ■ may be thought to be 

 somewhat different. But when it is analyzed, it will be found to be 

 quite or very nearly the same. In going from cause to effect, from 

 effect to cause, from premises to conclusions, from conclusions to 

 premises, from like to like, and from opposite to opposite, there will 

 be usually found elements in each, which the mind has before ob- 

 served or contemplated together. Where it is otherwise, it is gener- 

 ally not a case of memory, but of actual perception. 



Each of the very rapid motions, in the performance of instru- 

 mental music, and in other similar exercises, has been ascribed to a 

 distinct act of the memory, and an act of the will. Be it so ; and 



