88 On Definitions. 



Art. III. — On Definitions; by Rev. D. Wilkie, of Quebec. 



No. III. 



From the observations already made on this subject, it must evi- 

 dentlv appear that the terms employed in treating of moral subjects 

 do not admit of accurate logical definitions. The only means that 

 one man possesses of knowing what are the feelings of another man, 

 are by judging of causes by their effects, and of effects by their 

 causes. In either case, the feeling itself is unknown to us, and per- 

 ceptible only to the sentient being himself. We infer that like 

 causes produce similar effects in him, and in us, and that like feel- 

 ings lead to similar effects and similar expressions in him and in us. 



We have had experience that the prospect of good, of some ad- 

 vantage and happiness, affords us the pleasant feelings of hope. We 

 infer that it produces the same effect in him. We know the ani- 

 mated and lively expressions of joy which it led us to use. If we 

 see the same lively and animated conduct on his part, we attribute 

 it to the same cause ; and are especially confirmed in this opinion, 

 if we know that a similar cause existed to produce it. 



Still these inferences possess less or more the nature of conjec- 

 tures : the feeling itself remains forever unseen, but to the man 

 himself who has it. Mankind neither see it, nor can see it. They 

 can judge of it only by its effects, or by its causes. 



Besides we know in fact, that the feelings of mankind are widely 

 different on the same subjects. They are similar, but widely differ- 

 ent in extent. There must always, therefore, exist some degree of 

 uncertainty as to the names given to the feelings of the mind. We 

 may approach to strict definitions, but cannot obtain them with per- 

 fect accuracy. 



Hence it is, that all moral rules have a certain latitude, and must 

 be applied according to circumstances. If we examine any of the 

 most celebrated maxims of antiquity, or any of the best moral rules 

 laid down by the moderns, we shall find that there is scarcely one 

 of them, perhaps not one, which does not, in certain circumstances, 

 give rise to doubt, mistake, and disputation. The general course of 

 human life, it is true, is governed by rules which are clear and pre- 

 cise. But there are situations in which the application of every 

 rule that can be devised becomes doubtful and uncertain. 



