On Definitions. 89 



One of the maxims handed down from the early ages of the 

 Greeks, said to have been first delivered by Pittacus, M'as {Tvu&i 

 3caipog, occasionem cognosce,) observe, or act according to the occasion. 

 This maxim, if fairly interpreted, seems to imply, that our conduct 

 and behavior ought to be suited to the occasion before us, that is, 

 in fact, to the circumstances in vs^hich we are placed, which circum- 

 stances, are indeed the very causes why we are required to act. It 

 is impossible, therefore, that any advice can be more proper, or more 

 salutary, if fully acted on. Yet, by a very slight change in the mode of 

 viewing the precept, it may be understood in a totally different sense ; 

 it may be considered as sanctioning the practice of a time-server, 

 the most despicable of all characters, as studying to render every 

 change of circumstances, by every means in his power, subservient 

 to his immediate and personal interests. 



The more celebrated maxim, (rvu^i (j'£au7ov,) "know thyself, ap- 

 pears much less exceptionable, and is perhaps less liable to miscon- 

 struction than any rule that can be given. Yet even this has been 

 found subject, or at least, thought to be subject to misconception. 

 How often is it observed of persons of either sex, that they would 

 be better characters, that is, more observant of their moral duties, 

 if they knew less of the superiority of their personal qualities ? 

 This is one aspect in which the precept would seem to be wrong, 

 though in reality the error is only apparent ; for the knowledge which 

 is blamed, or thought hurtful in such persons, is only a partial 

 knowledge of themselves, and its ill effects would be entirely obvi- 

 ated by a fuller acquaintance with every thing that can be compre- 

 hended under the complex term, themselves. 



No rule in morals is of more extensive application, or more useful 

 in practice, than that which requires us to hold sacred the property 

 of another. The general application of this rule is obvious and 

 extremely easy. Yet no rule has given rise to such innumerable 

 questions, and we daily see hundreds of disputes arise out of this 

 subject, which give occasion to the most serious contestations, and 

 which nothing but superior authority, joined with superior knowledge, 

 can decide. Many of the questions that arise out of this very gen- 

 eral rule, are of so vague and intricate a nature, that nothing but 

 an arbitrary rule, applicable to all the cases that fall under it, can 

 serve the purpose of guiding the actions of mankind in regard to 

 them. For example, whether the property of any literary work 

 or invention, shall continue to be the author's or inventor's, for 



Vol. XXXI.— No. 1. 12 



