WILLIAM G. STEVENSON. 17 
the ‘‘ various departments of phenomena”’ in all their 
parts and reciprocal relations as antecedent and se- 
quence; while philosophy is deductive in its method, 
and seeks to group the orders of phenomena into a cos- 
mic whole, and learn the laws of their relations. 
There should be, therefore, no reprisals between these 
two methods of attaining truth, for they are mutually 
dependent, and, in their co-operative action, reflect the 
highest possibilities of thought. 
Notwithstanding the triumphs of mind in the realms 
of material phenomena—it has not transcended the 
boundaries of relative knowledge, nor lifted the veil that 
hides the omnipotent power of the universe. Toward 
the unfathomed mysteries beyond, the philosophic atti- 
tude of the mind is one not of deep assurance but of 
calm expectancy, and the question is yet asked, as by 
the Roman procurator of old—‘* What is truth ?”’ 
Philosophy has no key which can reveal the truth of 
things in themselves, ‘‘ but only as they are related to 
our intelligence.’’ Neither can the finite understanding 
know the infinite ; yet as the grand body of truth em- 
braced in geometrical science starts from axioms which 
are assumed to be true, but which can not be so demon- 
strated,—so philosophy—while it cannot show the es- 
sential nature of the substratum which constitutes the 
basis of objective realities,—cannot even ‘‘prove the 
existence of an external world,’’—it nevertheless postu- 
lates the existence of an Ultimate Reality that trans- 
cends the conceptions of the mind, as the one essential 
factor for all philosophical reasoning ; and, by logical 
processes,—the mind sweeps its curves of thought along 
lines of least resistance, until every where in nature is 
felt the influence of an intelligent power, whose exist- 
ence cannot be denied, although its essence may not be- 
defined. 
