562 



SCIENCE 



[N. S. Vol. XXX. No. 773 



American Scientific Congress at Santiago, 

 Chile, in January, 1909, with official delegates 

 from twenty American governments present, 

 not only took such action, but, in addition, 

 adopted on January 4 the following resolution : 

 Considering, that a neutral auxiliary interna- 

 tional language is necessary, and observing that 

 the idiom Esperanto fulfils the requirements, that 

 it is already sulficiently widespread throughout 

 the world, and that official propaganda alone is 

 lacking: 



1. That the First Pan-American Scientific Con- 

 gress decide to express to the American govern- 

 ments the pleasure with which it would view the 

 call for a congress to which would come official 

 representatives of all civilized countries, with the 

 purpose of solving the problem of the adoption of 

 a neutral international auxiliary idiom; and 



2. It agrees to urge upon the government of the 

 United States of North America that, under its 

 grand auspices this desire of the Scientific Con- 

 gress may be effected. 



The next Congress of Applied Chemistry 

 meets in America in 1912, the same year in 

 which the next Pan-American Scientific Con- 

 gress will gather in the same country. May 

 we not hope that before that time the expressed 

 desire of the latter will be realized, and that, 

 led by the United States, as suggested, the 

 governments of the nations will place in the 

 possession of every man the instrument by 

 which he can make himself understood by 

 every other man? 



At Washington, in the summer of 1910, will 

 meet still another international body, the 

 Sixth Annual Esperanto Congress, and if the 

 experience of recent preceding years is dupli- 

 cated, there will gather in attendance delegates 

 from thirty or more nations, speaking as many 

 languages; but, in great contrast to the con- 

 gress, the report of which inspired these re- 

 marks, the proceedings will be in only one 

 language — Esperanto. No time will be wasted 

 in translation or repetition and all the mem- 

 bers will understand everything that is done, 

 at the time, and will be able to discuss freely 

 all the matters presented. Every international 

 gathering and association can do the same, if 

 it will, instead of continuing to struggle with 

 the archaic system now in vogue. 



Surely all our scientific brethren will soon 



recognize this fact and a new step upward in 

 human progress will have been achieved. 



J. D. Hailman 



PlTTSBtTRGH, 



September 22, 1909 

 THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS IN GEOLOGY 



The importance of hypothesis and of theory 

 in geological research, as indeed in every other 

 branch of learning, can not be over-estimated. 

 Concrete facts are valuable, and their observa- 

 tion and accumulation are indispensable, but, 

 in pure science, they are of worth chiefly in 

 so far as they are available in explaining the 

 cause of the phenomena for which they stand. 

 The purpose of such science is to ascertain 

 why and under what circumstances present 

 effects were produced. Every hypothesis and 

 every theory is therefore an attempt to ex- 

 pound the relations between cause, condition 

 and effect. 



Granting that observation, as far as pur- 

 sued, has been correct, there are still many 

 reasons for disagreement in theories. Scanti- 

 ness and multiplicity of data may lead, re- 

 spectively, to error of interpretation and to 

 variety of inference. In both events, the per- 

 sonal equation is at a maximum. Again, lack 

 of experience — that is, want of a thorough 

 acquaintance with all the facts, not only in 

 the specific case which serves as a foundation 

 for the theory, but also in all similar occur- 

 rences — may result in diversity of opinion. 

 Very common, too, has been the tendency to 

 exaggerate the importance of some one par- 

 ticular factor or cause. Consider, for ex- 

 ample, the numerous efforts to account for a 

 glacial epoch. This fallacy is due partly to 

 the personal equation, partly to a failure to 

 discern all the premises, and partly to an 

 innate desire for simplicity, a craving which 

 induces the theorist to assign but one cause to 

 a given phenomenon. 



The misconception of the need for unity of 

 cause may be an outgrowth from the doctrine 

 of uniformity. But uniformity is not syn- 

 onymous with simplicity, any more than com- 

 plexity is synonymous with chaos. Nature is 

 orderly; its realms are everywhere subject to 



