22 



SCIENCE 



[N. S. Vol. L. No. 1279 



■whieli, combined with a highly efficient armor- 

 piercing projectile, insured a bursting of the 

 shell inside instead of outside the protecting 

 armor. They also had decided advantages in 

 under-water protection of their capital ships, 

 and so when one of their ships was mined or 

 torpedoed, it did not necessarily sink, while 

 the British ships when thus hit, rarely sur- 

 vived. The Germans had star-shells, unknown 

 at that time to the British. They could locate 

 the British destroyers at night without reveal- 

 ing their own position. The German search- 

 lights were more powerful and their control 

 more effective. Lights and guns could be 

 brought to bear upon a sighted vessel with a 

 minimum of delay. They had also a better 

 system of director firing of the secondary 

 armaments. 

 J How then did the Grand Fleet manage to 



do as well as it did ? Probably because officers 

 and men possessed enduring courage and that 

 fine spirit of determination to take any odds 

 and do their duty. We believe that our own 

 Navy has much of the same spirit. 



It is not to be supposed that the German 

 High Command did not know of the inferior 

 scientific equipment of the Grand Fleet. They 

 were fully aware of the departmental methods 

 and official inertia that can operate so effect- 

 ively to bar progress and arrest development. 

 Admiral Jellicoe places no blame for this fail- 

 ure to keep the Grand Fleet properly equipped, 

 yet his manifest apprehension when relieved 

 of conunand of the Fleet to accept promotion 

 as First Lord of the Admiralty indicates the 

 probable seat of the trouble. 



In the book there are constant references to 

 weather interference with naval operations. 

 It is invariably offered as justification for 

 change of course or failure to complete some 

 projected movement. One wonders if it ever 

 occurred to the High Lords of the Admiralty 

 that a decisive conflict would take place some 

 day between the fleets in the North Sea, and 

 that the issue might hang upon the weather, 

 as indeed it did? And was there a compre- 

 hensive study of the aerography of that ocean 

 available? There tvas not. The highest me- 

 teorological authority in Great Britain in- 



formed the writer, that "the English left the 

 study of the weather of the North Sea to the 

 Germans." 



In the memorandum issued to the fleet after 

 the Jutland battle it is stated that " weather 

 conditions of a highly unfavorable nature 

 robbed the Fleet of that complete victory 

 which was expected by all ranks . . ." and 

 King George visiting the fleet on June 15, 

 said to the captains, "Unfavorable weather 

 conditions and approaching darkness pre- 

 vented that complete result which you all ex- 

 pected; but you did all that was possible in 

 the circumstances. . . ." 



It is an open question whether the weather 

 prevented a victory. Fog and mist may 

 have helped the British, for certainly the 

 punishment inflicted by the German battle- 

 ships, when visibility permitted, was severe. 



In connection with the weather conditions 

 there is one interesting little sidelight on Lord 

 Kitchener's death. A northeast gale prevailed 

 at Scapa Flow, on June 5 when K.K. on his 

 way to Archangel visited the Grand Fleet. 

 It had been intended that the ship carrying 

 him and his escort should depart up the east- 

 em side of the Orkneys; but in conference, 

 owing to the gale, it was decided that the 

 Hampshire should take the west or lee side. 

 By the time the ship was outside, the center 

 of the storm had passed and the wind had 

 backed to the northwest. So there was no lee 

 on the west side of the Orkneys and when the 

 accident occurred the sea was so high that no 

 help could be rendered. In brief a faulty fore- 

 cast of the weather sent England's great cap- 

 tain and those with him to their doom. 



On p. 380 it is stated that " gunfire and 

 under-water explosions were heard at intervals 

 during the night and curiously enough the 

 under-water explosions, four or five in number, 

 were quite clearly recorded on a barograph in 

 the Malaya, a ship well placed for the pur- 

 pose as she was in the rear. There is little 

 doubt that these records showed the explosion 

 of our torpedoes against enemy ships." The 

 natural question is, what kind of a barograph 

 was it, and did any of the other barographs, 

 assuming there were some, show similar 



